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Preface 
 
 
The conference entitled ‘Uzbekistan in the context of Regional Security and Global Change’ 
was organized by the University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED) on 7th and 8th 
November 2019, under the aegis of the GCRF COMPASS project, led by the University of Kent. 
The conference addressed the importance of and directions for the continuing transformation 
of Uzbekistan. The position of Uzbekistan became a major factor in defining geopolitics of 
Central Asia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Tashkent was effectively seen as a driver 
for stability and a strong supporter of national sovereignty and regional identity. Since 2016, 
national reforms have made the country more open, effective and competitive on the 
international level. Uzbekistan is increasingly playing an important role in creating the conditions 
for regional solutions especially with regards to Afghanistan.  
 
This conference brought together academics from the GCRF COMPASS consortium including 
members from the Universities of Kent, Cambridge, ADA University, BSU, TNU and UWED, 
and wider afield - from other UK universities, the USA, Russia, Uzbekistan, China, Belgium and 
Afghanistan, as well as local and international policy-makers, to discuss some of the latest 
developments in the region. GCRF COMPASS’s goals to further understanding and build 
capacity vis-à-vis Eurasia and the UK was the main focus of the conference. The broad range 
of established and young scholars who attended the conference serves as testimony to the 
importance of the latest research and discussions about the wider Eurasian region especially 
with regards to Afghanistan and Uzbekistan.  
 
These Conference Proceedings include some of the papers that were presented at the 
conference which reflect on the aforementioned issues. The papers are solely the work of the 
authors, representing work in progress, and displayed in an alphabetical order.  
 
*** 
The GCRF COMPASS project (ES/P010849/1, 2017-21) is an ambitious UK government 
capacity-building funding initiative, aiming to connect UK research with regional global 
scholarship, to address the challenges of growth and sustainability in the developing countries. 
Notably, the COMPASS project led by the University of Kent, together with the University of 
Cambridge as its partner, seeks to establish ‘the hubs of excellence’ at the top-level HEIs in 
Belarus, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, to enable them to become the centres of 
knowledge sharing and transfer for research integration, impact governance, and 
sustainable communities.  
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ROY ALLISON1 – Challenges and prospects for Central 
Asian regionalism 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The early effort at regional self-organisation among the Central Asian states, to form distinct 
‘Central Asian’ regional institutions, was done in the absence of a real Central Asian identity. 
The launch of Central Asian Union (CAU) in July 1994 occurred at a difficult period of 
transition and failed to develop in the second half of that decade. In 1998 the formation of a 
Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) was announced. This seemed to be a new form 
of the Central Asian Union but it set up an awkward and ineffective superstructure formed of 
an Intergovernmental Council on the presidential level, councils of prime ministers, ministers 
of foreign affairs and defence and an executive committee. There were meetings but little 
policy development. Much of this was abolished when the CAEC was relaunched as the 
Central Asian Cooperation Organisation (CACO) in December 2001. 
 
CACO was a modified cooperation framework between Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan. It announced its commitment to the diversification of political dialogue, to the 
improvement of regional economic integration and to mutual understanding over the creation 
of a single economic space. It also paid some attention to relations with Afghanistan 
(Afghanistan was invited to join CACO as an observer in December 2002). However, a major 
problem remained. Behind much rhetoric, the CACO, like its predecessor regional structures, 
had a poor record of effective coordination during 2002-2004, whether in economic, trade or 
security affairs. Little was achieved over practical problems on the use of water, energy, 
transport and communications, or about moving gradually towards a common Central Asian 
market via a customs zone and a free trade zone. CACO’s resolutions mainly were 
declarative, a kind of ‘virtual regionalism’. 
 
Russia then joined CACO at a summit in October 2004. This spelled the end of the Central 
Asian states efforts at self-organisation on a regional basis. It also emphasised the problem 
of reaching compromises in a regional format. President Karimov implied that within CACO 
Russia could act as a guarantor to solve conflict situations among Central Asian states. 
However, Russia was hardly ready to mediate in or able to reconcile intricate disputes 
between Central Asian states. Russian interest in joining CACO was driven instead by the 
strategic importance of the Central Asia region for Russia.  
 
As it turned out CACO did not prove to be an effective vehicle for Russian strategic ambitions. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that Russia pressed for CACO to be merged into a more clearly 
Russia-dominated ‘virtual integration’ structure, the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC), 
which had been launched in October 2000, and emerged from a failed previous attempt at a 
                                                     
1 Professor, Oxford School of Global and Area Studies, University of Oxford.  
Contact: roy.allison@sant.ox.ac.uk 
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Customs Union. This merger placed the exclusively Central Asian ethos of CACO into a 
broader framework. When CACO and the EARC were merged in October 2005 it was 
described as a move to rationalise institutions with broadly overlapping goals. But former 
Uzbek President Karimov was probably correct when he talked scathingly about the absence 
of real cooperation in CACO between Central Asian presidents.   
 
New regional integration initiatives 
 
By 2005 some of the overt tensions between the larger Central Asian states had subsided or 
been deflected. They had common worries: the implications of coloured revolutions, the need 
to resist politically inspired Islamic groups as well other transnational security threats. In April 
2007 former Kazakh President Nazarbayev proposed that the Central Asian countries should 
develop as a ‘single space’, to create an area of economic prosperity as a barrier against 
international terrorism, religious extremism, drug trafficking and illegal migration. This shifted 
the emphasis to counteracting transnational challenges.  
 
Through the 2000s and beyond, the quality of the Kazakh-Uzbek relationship was a key factor 
for any chance of resurrecting the original impulse of the mid-1990s for regional coordination 
between the Central Asian states, beyond a weak Kazakh-Kyrgyz alignment. Turkmenistan 
continued to reject regional approaches and Tajikistan’s involvement was mostly nominal, 
because it lacked finances for joint projects and remained heavily dependent on Russia in 
military-political relations. However, as leaders of new states seeking to reinforce their 
sovereignty, the relationship of presidents Nazarbayev and Karimov was not close. 
Nazarbayev’s first visit to neighbouring Uzbekistan was only in March 2006. 
 
When the CACO was merged into the EAEC in 2005 Karimov suggested that Uzbekistan 
could join the EAEC, which happened in January 2006. This was not an easy step because 
the EAEC had been quite strongly associated with Nazarbayev’s effort to assert Kazakhstan’s 
role in Central Asia. Since the EAEC was founded Nazarbayev viewed it as an opportunity to 
advance his longstanding ideas for some kind of loose Eurasian integration involving 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (as well as Russia and Belarus). It was easy to 
interpret this as an effort opposed to Uzbekistan’s regional influence. 
 
When Uzbekistan joined the EAEC the latter became more Central Asian in composition. But 
it was not a Central Asian structure as such. Russian weight in the EAEC was obvious (Russia 
had 40% of the voting rights; Belarus, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan had 15% each; and 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan had 7.5% each). The EAEC made no breakthroughs in economic 
cooperation or trade – the fields which chiefly define its formal profile. So its purpose may 
have been more about mutual political support.  
 
However, political and security coordination with Russia could anyway be done better through 
the other large Russia-dominated regional structure, the Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation, which had a largely similar membership to the EAEC. EAEC and CSTO 
representatives at times simply changed chairs when leaders who participated in both bodies 
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met in the same venue. In this sense it seemed logical to merge these two structures, and try 
to develop economic goals in a separate structure. Indeed the EAEC did not last, Uzbekistan 
withdrew from it in 2008 and a plan to set up a separate customs union between Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia was reportedly agreed already in July 2007. This formed the 
background to the Customs Union and later the Eurasian Economic Union. 
 
Explaining past failures of Central Asian regional self-organisation 
 
How are we to explain this failure to develop regional institutions among just the Central Asian 
states? First, state capacity – the administrative, economic and other capacities of the states 
- has been a serious problem for the implementation of well-meant projects on a regional 
scale. This capacity varies greatly between the Central Asian countries.  
 
Second, we should take account of ideational factors. The effort by Central Asian states to 
forge their national identities and to give substance to their sovereignty had a centripetal 
effect, pulling apart rather than together. It discouraged the search for region-wide common 
features and interests and made it more difficult for national leaders to commit to deeper 
cooperation that requires real concessions in the interest of a wider regional framework of 
mutual benefits. Essentially there is a deep tension between nation-building and region-
building. In the 1990s and 2000s there remained various underlying intra-regional tensions 
between the states. There were also problems of border demarcation, which divided ethnic 
communities and natural resources.  
 
Thirdly, there are significant economic and trade barriers to overcome. By comparison ad hoc 
forms of cooperation in response to immediate security problems are much easier to achieve. 
But the higher goal of regionalism in foreign and security policies has often developed in other 
world regions on the basis of regional economic and trade arrangements. The goal of some 
kind of Central Asian customs union that underlay the CAU, CACO and the EAEC suggests 
a similar approach to developing this first ‘layer’ of regional interaction. However, there have 
been formidable barriers to this goal or even to the creation of well-functioning regional 
markets in Central Asia.  
 
A major obstacle is the impact of the Soviet-era transport infrastructure. But a deeper problem 
is that economic and trade relationships between Central Asian states have tended to be 
non-complementary and competitive. This results in differences in comparative advantage 
from regional projects. The incentives to cooperate are unequal. Basically there has been 
limited scope for regional trade between just the five Central Asian countries themselves. 
However, the potential benefits of integration rise sharply, especially for Kazakhstan, once 
the concept of the ‘region’ is widened to include large regional neighbours –  China, Iran, 
Turkey, Russia and the Indian subcontinent. But in the 2000s the policies in Central Asia 
limited market access to this wider regional market by artificially increasing already high 
transit costs, so regionalism was not encouraged on this basis.  
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Fourth, regionalism in Central Asia was weakened by the competitive power relationships of 
major powers, Russia, the United States and China. This resulted in different bilateral 
relationships of Central Asian states with these powers. After around 2003 there is more 
evidence of this kind of competitive bilateralism. Although the American role declined it was 
gradually replaced by a stronger Chinese presence. An effort to manage this Chinese role 
collectively through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has been only partially effective.  
 
Conclusion: Future prospects for Central Asian intergovernmental consultations 
 
In the current period there are positive enabling conditions and a strong logic to develop a 
less institutionalized high-level inter-governmental Central Asian consultative process. This 
kind of consultative process has been difficult in the past, given problems of border 
demarcation, water management and other divergent interests in Central Asia. However, 
since 2017 these differences have eased. This allowed a Central Asian Leaders’ Consultative 
Working Meeting to be held in March 2018 in Astana. This good-spirited meeting imposed no 
obligations and created no unrealistic expectations. 
 
The current consultative process may first address lower level practical tasks. But a more 
ambitious eventual goal would be to broadly address various common local threats and risks, 
which all parties understand can only effectively be addressed jointly. The need for this 
initiative to extend to cover security policy is prompted by the risks of returning jihadist radicals 
from the Middle East; the increasingly volatile conflict in Afghanistan with American force 
reductions and uncertain peace negotiations, involving a changing cast of actors; the 
increasing complexity of regional connections between extremism, narco-trafficking and 
transnational crime; as well as by the need for coordinated Central Asian perspectives in 
relation to UN bodies. 
 
Thematic priorities of such broader consultations should include responses to terrorism; this 
should continue to engage with expertise in this field in the United Nations, as well as in the 
SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure. But the new consultation process would be suited 
also in principle to better discussion of ongoing concerns about separatism. Different 
perspectives on this core issue, which are perhaps irreconcilable, have existed in the SCO 
and CSTO behind the formal discourse since 2014. An exclusively Central Asian dialogue 
could also help boost the regional identity of the long standing proposal for a Central Asian 
Nuclear-Free Zone. 
 
Preconditions of such a new consultative mechanism should be respect for national 
perspectives, decision-making based on consensus and the intention to avoid any elaborate 
structure or bureaucracy. Any supra-national structure for dialogue in particular is unrealistic; 
this would raise concerns over sovereignty and the operation of national jurisdictions. 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan may be more prominent in fostering these new consultations, 
building on their recent positive interaction. But Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan should also have 
a sense of ownership over the dialogue, and neutral Turkmenistan’s recent demonstration of 
its wish to engage in pragmatic cooperation with its neighbours should be explored in this 
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context. The effective involvement of Turkmenistan would distinguish this dialogue from all 
the other structures referred to above. 
 
There exists a considerable body of scholarly and expert work in universities, research 
institutes and Academies of Science about previous dialogue processes and structures for 
regional cooperation in Central Asia, as well as about similar dialogues among developing 
states more generally. There is obviously also much practical experience in the diplomatic 
community and UN to draw upon. Scientific and academic exchanges in the region and with 
experts in the wider international community can help with thinking about the practical task of 
formulating a more sustainable consultation process than some past efforts at regional 
cooperation. Finally, information and debate among civil societies in Central Asian states on 
the desirability of growing regional interaction is necessary. This is important to help 
overcome stereotypes and build support for future regional initiatives which will have practical 
consequences for local communities.  
 
 
FABIENNE BOSSUYT1 – The European Union’s new strategy 
for Central Asia: A game changer or more of the same?  
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper provides an early assessment of the European Union’s (EU) new strategy for 
Central Asia,2 which was launched in May 2019. In particular, it evaluates whether the new 
strategy can enable the EU to further optimise its role as an external actor in Central Asia 
and whether it can ensure that the EU’s involvement in the region produces tangible and 
lasting results, especially in view of contributing to the sustainable development of the 
Central Asian countries. 
 
Over the past two decades, the EU’s role in Central Asia has gradually evolved from an 
invisible and ineffective donor to that of a more full-fledged external actor. The strategy that 
the EU developed back in 20073 played an important part in enhancing the EU’s role in 
Central Asia. Nevertheless, 12 years after the strategy was launched, the EU still punches 
below its weight in the region, where it clearly plays second fiddle to Russia and China. And 
admittedly, it is still facing substantial challenges in having a tangible impact in a region 
considered as one of the most authoritarian in the world.4 Hence, the question remains how 
the EU can optimise its role as an external actor in Central Asia to ensure that its involvement 
in the region produces tangible and lasting results, and effectively contributes to the 
sustainable development of the Central Asian countries. Now that the EU has launched its 
long-awaited new strategy for Central Asia, the question is also whether the new strategy 
will be up to this challenge, and thus whether it will effectively enable the EU to further 
optimise its role as an external actor in Central Asia.  
  
Balancing and building synergies via a ‘non-exclusive’ partnership 
 
Although the EU has become an increasingly important actor in Central Asia, its influence 
remains only secondary to that of Russia and China. It would be naïve to think that one day 
the EU will become as influential in the region as Moscow and Beijing; in fact, this is not the 
EU’s ambition. However, if we consider that China’s and Russia’s engagement poses both 
opportunities and challenges for Central Asia and that the region remains vulnerable to the 
influence of these two dominant actors, then it becomes straightforward to acknowledge that 
the EU occupies a distinct position as an external actor in Central Asia. This applies on two 
accounts.  
                                                     
1 Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Ghent University. Email: fabienne.bossuyt@ugent.be. 
2 European Union (2019). ‘Joint Communication on the EU and Central Asia: New opportunities for a stronger 
partnership’. Published on 15.05.2019 at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage/62411/joint-communication-eu-and-central-asia-new-opportunities-stronger-partnership_en. 
3 Council of the EU (2007). ‘The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a new Partnership’. Published on 31.05.2007 
at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/st_10113_2007_init_en.pdf. 
4 Bossuyt, Fabienne (2019). “The EU’s and China’s development assistance towards Central Asia: low versus 
contested impact”. Eurasian Geography and Economics 59(5-6): 606 631. 
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First of all, the EU is considered by the Central Asian states as an important actor in terms 
of balancing the influence of Russia and China. The EU is perfectly aware of this, and even 
explicitly mentions this in the new strategy. Secondly, and related to the first point, the EU is 
also an important actor in Central Asia in terms of offering alternative models and solutions, 
especially in specific soft policy areas, including education, environmental protection, border 
management and technological innovation. Given that the EU is considered to be a role 
model for modernisation in these specific fields throughout the region, it is uniquely placed 
to offer support and to share its experience in these areas. In several soft policy areas, the 
EU has a competitive edge compared to other external actors. Also this aspect is now 
explicitly acknowledged in the new strategy of the EU. 
 
However, at the same time, the EU should also build synergies in Central Asia with other 
external actors, including with China and Russia. This seems necessary for two reasons. 
First of all, this seems necessary as a way to maximize the impact of the EU’s involvement 
in the region. Clearly, in certain policy areas, joining forces with other powerful actors will 
amplify the likelihood of having a positive and lasting effect rather than when doing it alone. 
Connectivity is one such area. Connectivity also stands out as an area where collaboration 
with China and Russia actually seems feasible. This is especially so for China, which 
recognises that it will need to cooperate with the EU if it is to successfully pursue its Belt and 
Road Initiative. 
 
A second reason why the EU needs to build synergies with other external actors is to 
counterbalance or temper the negative effects of other actors’ involvement, including those 
of Russia and China. Again, the area of connectivity serves as a prime example. By 
collaborating with China on investing in transport infrastructure, the EU could help to enhance 
the sustainability of these investments and ensure that they comply with international norms 
and standards, including transparency and environmental sustainability. 
 
The new EU strategy for Central Asia fully acknowledges this need for building synergies 
with other external actors operating in the region. In fact, it is one of the key elements of the 
new strategy. This is captured in the aim of forging what the strategy labels a “non-exclusive” 
partnership with the countries of Central Asia. In the strategy it is outlined that in forging this 
non-exclusive partnership, the EU aims to help the region develop as a more resilient, 
prosperous and closely interconnected economic and political space. These aspects are 
singled out as the main, interlinked, priorities of the new strategy. 
 
The EU believes these key priorities capture the niche areas where the EU has comparative 
advantages with other external actors. At first sight, it thus appears that the strategy does 
contain the necessary elements for enabling the EU to become a more influential and 
effective actor in Central Asia. 
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A more mature foreign policy actor 
 
All in all, the new strategy does represent a considerable improvement compared to the 2007 
strategy. If anything, the new strategy testifies to the EU having matured as a foreign policy 
actor. Moreover, many of the key recommendations that have been given to the EU as part 
of the consultation process have been reflected in the new strategy.  
 
First of all, the EU has redefined its interests in Central Asia, although perhaps not as 
prominently and explicitly as it could have, but at least it is clear that in redefining its interests 
the EU is taking into account the new global realities, as well as the new dynamics in and 
around the region.  
 
Back in 2007, the EU was mainly drawn to Central Asia by the region’s strategic location, its 
vast energy resources and market potential. As it now stands, the EU seems to be drawn 
mostly by the goal of maintaining stability and security in Central Asia, as well as the goal of 
tapping into the connectivity potential of the region. 
 
The strategy also reflects a more accurate understanding of the region and the different 
realities and aspirations of the five countries. On this point, the EU explicitly states that it 
respects the national trajectories, aspirations and interests of each of its Central Asian 
partners and it will seek to deepen its engagement with the interested countries of the region 
that are willing and able to step up cooperation on shared goals.  
 
Connected to this, the strategy also reflects a more realistic notion of the leverage that the 
EU has in Central Asia. It also does a better job at identifying how it can make a difference 
and in what ways it stands out. In this regard, it is clear that the EU has tried to take on board 
the central recommendation of making sure that the key areas to be covered in future EU-
Central Asia cooperation reflect a match between the EU’s comparative advantages (namely 
areas where the EU can provide real added value and achieve concrete results) and the vital 
needs of the Central Asian countries.  
 
Given that the EU is considered a role model for modernisation and regional cooperation 
throughout the region, the EU now took advantage of this by stressing that it is uniquely 
placed to offer support and share its experience in specific soft policy areas like education 
and the environment. 
 
 
 
 
Broad scope 
 
However, when looking at the strategy in more depth, it quickly becomes clear that the new 
strategy suffers from some arguably inevitable and even predictable flaws that are likely to 
undermine the potential of the strategy to deliver. 
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Like the previous strategy, the new strategy covers too many areas. The two priority areas 
of boosting resilience and enhancing prosperity are also very broadly defined. One of the 
key recommendations that had been given to the EU by several experts was that the new 
strategy for Central Asia should focus on fewer areas in order to increase its effectiveness. 
Basically, the advice to the EU was: do less but better. Given the relatively limited budget, 
doing a bit of everything is not effective. Despite the EU being among the main donors in 
Central Asia and despite a steady increase in the budget allocations for the EU’s involvement 
in the region in the past decade, the financial resources that the EU has at its disposal to 
implement the strategy remain fairly limited, and this is unlikely to change.   
 
Instead of following up on the recommendation of doing less and hence reducing the number 
of cooperation areas, the EU actually increased the number of cooperation areas, and even 
explicitly refers to a widening partnership agenda. That said, this is not really a big surprise. 
It was predictable that it would be hard to make the new strategy focus on only a few areas. 
One could say it is the nature of the beast. When it comes to EU foreign policy making, the 
policies will always have to reflect the varying priorities of the different EU member states 
and of the wide range of institutional actors involved in drafting and adopting the strategy.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has provided an early assessment of the EU’s new strategy for Central Asia. The 
paper has shown that, at first sight, the new strategy appears to contain the necessary 
elements for enabling the EU to become a more influential and effective actor in Central Asia 
and represents a considerable improvement compared to the 2007 strategy. If anything, the 
new strategy testifies to the EU having matured as a foreign policy actor and reflects many 
of the key recommendations that have been given to the EU as part of the consultation 
process. However, this paper also critically evaluated the broad scope of the strategy and 
argued that the ambition of contributing to so many areas of cooperation is likely to 
undermine the EU’s potential to deliver.  
 
As a concluding remark, it should be pointed out that a more fundamental change in the EU’s 
approach would be needed in order for the EU’s involvement in the region to eventually have 
a more tangible and effective impact. Indeed, if the EU is serious about promoting resilience 
as a way to empower the Central Asian societies and to contribute towards a truly sustainable 
future for the Central Asian countries, then the EU would have to accept the Central Asian 
societies for what they are and advocate home-grown self-organisation and self-governance 
predicated on a deep understanding of the local meaning of good life.5 The new strategy 
does not reflect any such approach, and instead shows that the EU remains too much 
entrenched in its own way of thinking and acting, which is literally miles away from the local 
way of thinking and doing things in Central Asia. As the EU’s messages of democracy, good 
governance and human rights hardly resonate with the Central Asian societies, the EU will 
                                                     
5 Korosteleva, Elena (2019). ‘Reclaiming resilience back: A local turn in EU external governance’. 
Contemporary Security Policy, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2019.1685316. 
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need to start embracing a more locally-inspired approach, which gives true ownership to the 
local societies of their own development. 
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BAKHTIYOR ISLAMOV1, DONIYOR ISLAMOV2, and 
SITORA PRIMOVA3 - Uzbekistan’s support for the 
synergy of the TRACECA and "Belt and Road Initiative" 
Projects  
 
 
Introduction 
 
International transport corridors (ITC) play an important role in Uzbekistan, because it is 
one of the only two double landlocked countries in the world (along with Liechtenstein), 
which means it is landlocked itself and also surrounded by countries that do not have 
direct access to the ocean, namely: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan 
and Afghanistan. The country’s geographical location, practically in the center of Eurasia, 
far from seaports, necessitates the intensive development of underground (pipelines, 
telecommunication cables), land (truck roads and railways) and air transport corridors 
connecting Uzbekistan with markets in the West and East, North and South. 
 
Today the ITC initiatives have become the most topical subject on the agenda of global 
development as well as international and regional economic, transport 
and trade relations. From the very beginning, Uzbekistan supported these initiatives of a 
large-scale mega-project as the state’s priority strategic task.4  The country implements 
many large investment projects: the construction and reconstruction of railways and 
roads, airports, the development of infrastructure for free economic zones and transport 
and logistics centers. It is important to form a coherent system of domestic and 
international transport corridors with a view to more efficient participation in the 
international market for by optimising and reducing the cost of cargo and passengers 
transportation. Many of these projects are implemented in the framework of theTRACECA 
project (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) and the Belt and Road Initiative. In 
this paper, we consider that better coordination of these projects could create larger 
synergetic effects. 
 
International logistics networks: TRACECA 
 
Currently, Uzbekistan has the highest density of road networks in the Central Asian region 
and has an integrated system of railway junctions connecting all regions of the country. 
With the launch of the international airport in Navoi (which is an aviation hub), this airport 
has become the largest center for air cargo transportation, offering comprehensive 
logistics services for air, road and rail transportation of goods. An international multi-
                                                     
1 Professor, Doctor of economic sciences, Tashkent Branch of REU named after G.V. Plekhanov. 
2 Director of RB Asia, Tashkent. 
3 PhD student, UWED. 
4 Mirziyoyev, Sh. M. (2019). Speech at the international forum "One belt, one road." "True East". 27 April 
2019.  
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modal logistics center has been created on the airport, which combines air cargo to 
Europe, India, China, Japan, South Korea and the countries of Southeast Asia. 
 
Figure 1. Map of main airport connections in Uzbekistan 
 
 
Source: adapted by the authors 
 
The position of the Republic of Uzbekistan in the international Logistics Performance 
Index (LPI) has improved significantly in recent years. However, Uzbekistan is still in the 
99th position. While the republic’s integration into the system of international transport 
corridors is being accelerated, the implementation of transit and export-import potential 
requires further improvement of all available modes of transport, as well as using 
traditional routes.  
 
There are several projects that could become important new links between West and 
East, and Europe and Asia; and create additional synergetic effects in future. These 
include the EU’s TRACECA project, the formation of the ITC Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-
Iran-Oman, as well as the construction of the railway Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan-China along 
an existing truck road as a part of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).   
 
From the beginning of the TRACECA programme, Uzbekistan tried to use its transport 
potential to benefit the development of transport connections between Europe and Asia. 
TRACECA promotes alternative international combined traffic, because of being a 
multimodal system of air, road and railway routes.  Participation in the TRACECA 
programme had a positive influence on the transport sector of the Republic both from the 
point of view of infrastructure development and for institutional strengthening, legislation 
improvement and capacity building in the country. The programme, which started in 1993, 
provided technical assistance to Uzbekistan in the form of consulting support (worth about 
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10 million Euros), and investment projects (worth over 4 million Euros). Uzbekistan 
nowadays participates in the implementation of the Strategy of the Intergovernmental 
Commission (IGC) TRACECA up to 2026, based on a TRACECA Master Plan and 
proposals of the different countries, a plan of activities and an Action Plan for 2018-2021. 
Uzbekistan is also discussing its accession to the Agreement on Joint Financing of the 
Permanent Secretariat (PS) IGC TRACECA between the Governments of the Parties to 
the Basic Multilateral Agreement on International Transport for Development of the 
Europe-Caucasus–Asia Corridor as well as the Protocols and Agreements of TRACECA 
for ratification by Uzbekistan5. 
 
The Belt and Road Initiative 
 
In the context of ITC initiatives, implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative is also 
opening new possibilities for the development of transport infrastructure and trade. The 
concepts of the TRACECA and BRI are focused not only on the trade agenda, but they 
also have a significant investment dimension. Relations between European countries, 
Central Asian states and China, which share a long history via the ancient Silk Road,6 
today have reached a new level of cooperation. China, for example, is one of the largest 
trade and investment partners of Uzbekistan and other countries of Central Asia. 
According to statistics, in 1992 the total commodity turnover of the PRC with the five 
Central Asian countries was about 0.5 billion US dollars. According to the Ministry of 
Commerce of the PRC, in 2012, after 20 years, this figure had risen to a record 46 billion 
US dollars, increasing 92 times.7 In 2018, the trade turnover between Uzbekistan and 
China reached 6.42 billion USD, showing a growth of another 35%. 
      
There are currently 1,121 enterprises with the participation of Chinese investments 
in Uzbekistan, of which 344 enterprises were created in 2018, which is more than double 
the figure for 2017. China has more than 8 billion US dollars of investments8 in Uzbekistan 
that also included a variety of social projects, aimed at the human development,9 the 
fight against poverty, and strengthening of the healthcare system.10 
 
At the second meeting of the BRI forum, President Xi Jinping noted that he considered 
Uzbekistan as an important strategic partner and was ready to work together to achieve 
common development and prosperity, peace and stability in Central Asia. The financial 
capital scale project includes about 900 infrastructure projects (truck roads, railways, 
                                                     
5 TRACECA (2016). Uzbekistan, its role in the IGC TRACECA and further activities is on the Agenda of 
discussion.   
6 Erohin, X.H. (2017). “Trade between China and the countries of Central and North Asia: dynamics, 
structure, and major tendencies”, p.117. 
7 Nabizhan, M.U. (2018). "Assessment of the Chinese initiative ‘One belt - one road’" in: Cui Zheng and 
Qu Wenyi (eds.). p97. 
8 Alimova S. G. (2017) “Uzbekistan on the Great Silk Road”. Internauka 2017, p68. 
9 Sputnik Uzbekistan (2019). How the New Silk Road will help the republic: The President of Uzbekistan 
will take part in the International Forum "One Belt, One road" as part of his visit to China from April 24-27.  
10 Ergashev B. (2019). “On the advantages and risks for the Central Asia of the project ‘One belt, one 
road’”.  CA-IR NEWS. 
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ports, power plants, bridges, etc.) in more than 60 countries. The total amount, according 
to experts, ranges from 2 to 3.5 trillion US dollars.11  
 
In order to fund such projects, China has established two new institutions: the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank in the US, with a capital of 100 billion US dollars; and the 
Foundation of the Silk Road, whose authorized capital amounts to 40 billion US dollars, 
with plans to create a separate fund with capital worth 30 billion US dollars. The 
Foundation is also expected to attract funds from a number of state financial institutions 
of the PRC, including the New Development Bank, the Development Bank, the Export-
Import Bank, and the Chinese Investment Corporation.12  
 
The BRI is gaining a more and more global character day after day. It is supported by 
international organisations, and it is included in documents of the UN, G20, APEC, and 
others. What is the role of Uzbekistan in this global project and how does the BRI 
correspond with the country’s national and state interests? 
 
The development of international transport corridors is one of the most important priorities 
of Uzbekistan. The construction of the railway Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan-China within the 
framework of the BRI is a mutually beneficial project for all of its participants. Ultimately, 
Uzbekistan will get more direct access to China, as well as China with Central Asia and 
the Middle East, as well as to Europe. Cargo transportation time will be reduced by 
several days.13  This will primarily improve trade relations, open new markets for 
Uzbekistan and for the rest of the project participants, create new jobs, bring profit from 
transit, and attract tourists. Reconstruction of new roads, including the creation of the 
Andijan-Osh-Irkeshtam-Kashgar corridor and the laying of the railway along this route will 
open a new prospective line of the BRI project. 
 
Major Markets 
 
For Uzbekistan, the issue of security has always been relevant and a top priority. The 
continuation of "Hairaton - Mazar-i-Sharif” and construction of the railway from Mazar-i-
Sharif to Herat will further open the way to the southern ports of Iran.14 The possibility of 
access to the sea is an important motivation for Uzbekistan. The development of 
international transport corridors means not only access to new markets, it is also an 
opportunity for Uzbekistan to express itself more loudly on the world stage and attract 
more investments. 
 
Uzbek-Chinese relations are actively developing in all areas, including trade, investment, 
energy, technology, the cultural and humanitarian sphere. All these areas will also help 
                                                     
11 Daliev F. (2018). "On the projects of the New Great Silk Road implemented in Uzbekistan”. 
Colloquium- journal, 5 (16), pp14-15. 
12 Arabov, A. (2017) “’One belt, one road’ - what will Uzbekistan get?” 
13 “The Economic Belt of the Silk Road and Uzbekistan” (2017). Available at:  
http://blog.review.uz/new/ekonomicheskij-poyas-shelkovogo-puti-iuzbekistan/ 
14 Aripov, E. (2019). "’One Belt, One Road’: mega opportunity-megaproject". People's Word 2019: 144. 
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attract direct foreign investors in the framework of the BRI, which thanks to the 
geographical position will pass through Uzbekistan and create good opportunities to 
activate the investment flow.   
 
An essential condition for the comprehensive development of countries is the introduction 
of innovations and the improvement of their scientific and technological potential. In this 
regard, the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan proposed to create a comprehensive 
BRI partnership system in priority areas of scientific and innovative activity. It is known 
that the development of science and innovation requires a decent amount of finance, 
which is also an urgent issue for developed countries. The BRI is an opportunity to pool 
funds and accelerate scientific and technological progress, and to create various types of 
free economic zones by using the Chinese experience. An advantage is also the ability 
to exchange scientific personnel and improve the skills of specialists in Uzbekistan.15 
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite the mega-capabilities described above, according to a number of experts, the 
large-scale projects also entail potential risks. For instance, with the creation of a railway 
from China through Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan further to Europe and the Middle East, a 
huge flow of imports is expected which can be a serious threat to the emerging domestic 
small and medium business.16  
 
Is the Uzbek market ready for such competition, when there will be a dominance of 
Chinese goods in terms of both quality and price? Competition is a lever for development, 
but such a decomposition can cause some damage to the emerging market of 
Uzbekistan. Domestic producers currently do not experience such level of competition 
from Chinese goods, but when they open the road, the import of goods will increase and 
local producers should be ready for such competition.17  
 
In general, the opportunities and prospects of the TRACECA and the BRI initiatives by 
far outweigh the potential risks. The new projects could provide a fundamentally new level 
for the development of trade, economic, scientific, technical, and investment relations with 
Europe and rest of Asia. The authors of this paper therefore consider that better 
coordination of these projects could create larger synergetic effects for Uzbekistan and 
all other countries involved into these projects. 
 
 
 
                                                     
15 Sun Lijie (S.D.). Chinese Ambassador to the Republic of Uzbekistan. China and Uzbekistan follow the 
path of joint construction of “One Belt and One Path”.  
16 Cheng Guo, Chen Lu, (2019).“Implications of ‘One belt-one road’ strategy for China and Central Asia”.  
p165. 
17 Aubakirova A., Umirzakov S., Aitenov N., (2017). “The New Silk Road: Opportunities and Threats for 
Central Asia”. Central Asia and the Caucasus magazine. p7. 
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ELENA KOROSTELEVA1 - Resilience: another buzzword or 
a new opportunity for more adaptable governance? 
 
Introduction: problematising resilience 
 
Resilience is now everywhere and has become “the everyday”: It seems to mean “all things 
to all people” and speak to every aspect of our daily lives–from “resilient” economies, 
cultures, sport, health, family, Brexit, to children’s TV (“resilient Peter Rabbit” on CBeebies), 
and even “resilient humanity” in “Doctor Who,” a popular BBC sci-fi series. It has also 
pervaded the governance agenda of major international institutions including the WB, NATO, 
UNDP, OSCE, and the EU: their focus is equally all-encompassing making “resilience” one 
of the most inclusive and popular terms of the day.  
 
However, with this broad appeal, and a recent surge in popularity, are we sure we understand 
the concept of resilience well enough, to make full use of its arresting potential – especially 
living in the VUCA-world of today?2 Is it just about an entity, be it a state, a community or a 
person, and its qualities including their “inherent strength” and “capacity”, the knowledge and 
development of which could make them more robust and responsive to change? Or is it also 
about how we should think today to make governance more adaptive, and communities more 
self-organizing in times of uncertainty and diminishing control, to enable them to build a life 
people have reason to value and strive for? To this end, should resilience always be 
associated with an emergency, or is it more about a long-term development, shaped by a 
sense of "good life" and communal values, and upheld by relevant institutions? More 
importantly, can resilience be engineered externally, as the policy world tends to believe? 
And if not, how to build resilience internally, in practice? Curiously, none of these questions 
would receive a clear or unifying answer today.  
 
In the policy world, resilience was propelled to prominence with the EU Global Strategy.3  It 
was understood both as a ‘local quality’, and as a new regime of governance, to help the EU 
de-centre to empower “the local” and “the person” to better respond to change in a 3-C world 
– namely, a world with more connectivity, complexity and contestation. However, when it 
comes to practice, resilience was turned immediately into a risk-management exercise, and 
“the local, in turn,” into a source of vulnerability/threat, deprived of agency, and requiring 
urgent security measures.  
 
In the scholarly world there is a confused perception of resilience – from ‘papering-over the 
cracks’ to seeing it as a tool of neo-liberal governmentality, to be managed via externally 
engineered technologies of power and self-securitising practices. Only a few have come to 
appreciate its virtues, but even then, they doubt its potential in the age of the Anthropocene 
calling it an act of impossibility. Why bother with resilience under these circumstances? 
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Is this a dead end for resilience as we know it, or more precisely, not yet know it? Resilience 
does have an arresting potentiality, provided it is “reclaimed” and “repatriated” back to “the 
local,” to belong to the “community,” a social system that “feeds upon deviations … and 
thrives upon disruptions to its own state of equilibrium [emphasis added]”4, based on self-
reliance, self-organisation and self-governance. We claim it to be self-governance, which 
would require a shift from the global to the local, to understand and engage with the local, 
but also to see if a set duality of governance–that is, providing external assistance as 
necessary and when requested – may work. If it is about the local, how do we then ensure 
the balance of power going back to the global, and especially a sense of cooperation needed 
for different orders to co-exist and thrive? 
 
In my recently published article (Korosteleva, 2019), I look at how resilience is being defined 
in the policy and scholarly worlds to claim that resilience, if understood correctly – as both a 
quality and an analytic of governance – helps us to make “the person” centre-stage and 
governance more adaptive and responsive to their needs.5  
 
Resilience as a tool of EU governance  
 
Resilience has rapidly spread driven by the desire to respond in a more sustainable way to 
the environment’s growing complexity and uncertainty. In the UK, for example, resilience 
became “part and parcel” of government thinking in the 2000s, defined as a strategy for 
“better preparedness and ability to respond to an emergency … using local resources and 
knowledge”. The World Bank sees it as “a capacity to mitigate the impact of disaster-related 
asset losses on welfare”.6 The OSCE, in turn, defines resilience as a “capacity to prevent 
and recover from hazardous events or shocks, but also as a “capacity to support a constant 
transformative action to allow societies to adapt in the face of continual change”. NATO, for 
example, uses the definition of “being prepared – that is, having thought, planned and 
exercised in order to 'absorb, recover and then adapt to adverse events’”.7  
 
This snapshot shows that the emphasis is on the internal capacity of an entity to prepare to 
cope with adversity, but a far greater emphasis is on the external intervention to help 
“engineer” a more resilient response to problem-solving. The underlying assumption is that 
a system can only develop resilience if it is amenable to external governing, which would 
assist the “internal” agency with knowledge and resources to help it recover and transform, 
to be able to mitigate future risks.  
 
This is what forms the premise of the EU’s new thinking today: Being the world’s largest 
humanitarian donor, the EU saw resilience then as a jointly engineered long-term effort to 
“support populations at risk to withstand, cope with and adapt to repeated adverse events 
and long-term stress”.8  To increase “resilience” of an entity meant activating the EU 
                                                     
4 Luhmann (1990). 
5 See also Korosteleva and Flockhart (forthcoming, 2020).  
6 World Bank (2016) 
7 Lasconjarias, 2017, p. 3 
8 European Commission, 2012, p. 2 
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machinery of governance to help the entity develop “internal” critical infrastructures to reduce 
the intensity of a variety of impacts.  
 
To sum up, the first important iterations of resilience-thinking in the EU official (humanitarian-
development) discourse were already ridden with tensions. On the one hand, the 
Commission saw “the local” as a critical beneficiary (and “a keeper”) of resilience articulated 
through the narratives of “inherent strength” and internal “capacity” to respond and transform, 
while the EU would serve as a mentor, a partner, and facilitator. On the other hand, the 
Commission explicitly espoused to deal with a volatile outside, a problem at source 
externally, through directive governance and “sound methodologies” of policy solutions 
prioritising interventions for resilience-growth. This meant investing effort predominantly in 
EU assistance to provide, assess, and risk-manage “the outside,” while ensuring that these 
resilience-building measures–“readiness, responsiveness and revitalization”–are also duly 
embedded in national programmes, in anticipation of the future “resilience dividend”.   
 
From 2016, as developed by the EU Global Strategy, resilience became “a means not an 
end” to secure a more governable, and stable outside, especially at a time of crises and 
uncertainty. The uptake of this security turn in EU resilience-thinking was to make “the 
outside” more “predictable” and “manageable.” The downside was, however, the denial of 
agency to “the local”, and subsequent focus on “better risk-informed analysis and 
monitoring,” especially for “how external resilience can impact the EU’s own resilience in 
areas such as hybrid threats, cyber security, strategic communication and counter-terrorism”. 
If EU governance has not changed, why bring in resilience? As a fig-leaf measure – old 
governance in the new wineskins? The question here is more just about understanding 
resilience: it is about changing how we govern today 1) how to deal with a forever less 
governable outside, and 2) yet how to support it in its individuation for the “good life” worth 
fighting for.  
 
Resilience: a scholarly perspective 
 
Resilience has predominantly been viewed by wider scholarship as “retrospective 
temporality,” with a focus on its origin and many meanings. A “prospective temporality” of 
resilience has been mainly adopted by a neo-liberal perspective displaying a range of 
similarities with the liberal logics of governance, most notably in the ideational production of 
autonomy and freedom for “the outside.” However, problems arise when it is applied to 
practice. Resilience as an analytic of governing aims to grow the capacity of local 
communities as self-referential social systems. Conversely, the neo-liberal agenda is 
committed to externalising “good governance” of Western institutions to local communities, 
which are then supposed to embed these solutions in the national programmes to make 
themselves sustainable.9  –Its aim would be to engender a like-minded environment, but 
instead of reducing complexity it generates insecurity by making local communities 
dependable on the external source, and offering problem-solving measures of only a 
temporary nature.  
                                                     
9 Joseph (2013).  
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The most contrasting difference between resilience-thinking and a neoliberal agenda, 
however, lies in the production of freedom: the difference emerges when "good governance" 
interferes with the logics of internal capacity-building, thus denying agency to local 
communities. 
 
Another contrasting feature of resilience-thinking to neoliberalism, is its grasp of complexity: 
neo-liberal thinking is about compartmentalising; resilience thinking is about emergent and 
“limitless” governance.  
 
Resilience as ‘present temporality’ is an alternative way of thinking undertaken by the 
“Anthropocene”. However, while affording a better understanding of resilience it is 
nevertheless often seen as an act of impossibility due to the lack of control over the outside 
.10 “The global” in this resilience-thinking can only be conceived through “the local” and its 
governance domain, defined by more bottom-up and responsive regional orders. The 
Anthropocene has the advantage of breaking silos and external-internal boundaries in 
delivering governance for human empowerment. The Anthropocene imaginary “forces 
humans to confront the limits of knowledge” and promises “new ways of being and knowing 
without separations and cuts dependent on linear spatial and temporal conceptions of the 
world”.11  
 
Yet, the Anthropocene comes with its caveats. One relates to its path-dependent reactive 
temporality of thinking when responding to the challenges without setting the goals for 
development. Being in a reactive and perhaps more agile mode is one matter; but striving to 
make choices for the betterment of community is another, and it is this purposefulness, 
including planning, of collective living, that seems to be missing from the current 
Anthropocene-thinking. The second challenge is how to get there, when contextualizing 
resilience in each given case, without knowing “the knowns” or “the unknowns”; and when 
the boundaries of knowledge are no longer a blockage. The concept of governance is simply 
an act of impossibility in the Anthropocene. 
 
We suggest to view resilience as self-governance with external assistance as necessary. Is 
realising and practising this kind of resilience possible? Could resilience be less than a 
buzzword especially for the world of practitioners? 
  
Resilience: not a buzzword but not quite yet a silver bullet 
 
So, the main question remains: is resilience as self-governance – that is, “where governance 
is no longer a matter of intervening”12 – possible in a policy world of embedded external-
internal duality, faced with the increasing “uncontrollability” and growing complexity of a 
rapidly changing environment? For adaptive governance predicated on resilience as self-
organisation to occur, it would require a shift from understanding resilience just as a system’s 
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12 Chandler (2014, p. 27). 
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quality, to its becoming an analytic of governance embracing complexity in full. In practice, 
this would mean the following: 
 
First, for a policy world to embrace “self-governance” as resilience-building of local 
communities would mean, first, a shift away from instrumental security-predicated 
governance operating in a “world amenable to cause-and-effect understandings of policy-
making”.13 This is primarily due to how external governance has been intended to-date in a 
Western policy world: to secure the “unstable outside” using, where possible, existing 
problem-solving technologies of security governance, delivered via dissemination of best 
practice and security measures to bring “the outside” in line with the international “normal.” 
This ought to change, if resilience-thinking were to be properly applied, with a view of 
allowing the emergence of many different governing domains, and also the need to bring 
them to a “shared normal” under a renewed global governance architecture. This thinking 
clearly challenges the foundations of International Relations as a discipline for how “the 
global” should be understood and studied today. 
 
Second, a shift away from the idea of engineering and managing resilience outside-in would 
be needed. Resilience-thinking has to offer a different kind of governing analytic, to start with 
the communities, and work their way “inside-out” when seeking assistance and advice as 
necessary, thus building up “the global” through “the local” and this way, making “the global” 
system far more connected, responsive and agile to the needs of the local communities.  
 
Third, a new understanding of where resilience is constituted, namely in the local domain, as 
well as of what it means:  the value of ‘good life’, identity, local ownership, inherent strength 
and resources. Each community would have an inner sense of what is invariably good for 
them as a collective, to be underpinned by respective primary institutions and governance 
structures in search for congruence between values and tradition, on the one hand, and 
achieving the ideational “Significant We”,14 on the other. Many communities have tacit words 
to depict this sense of communal becoming. For example, the Arabic term “al-harak,” refers, 
as Sadiki argues  to the “peoplehood” to encapsulate their vision for a better life,15 
comparable to “agaciro” in African ,16 “hygge” in Danish,17 or “mahalla” in Kazakh. It implies, 
as Rutazibwa argues, people’s “understanding that [they] are the agents of [their] own 
change”,18 a particular philosophy of life that draws on self-reliance and the inner knowledge 
of the people of what they are, and what they want to be, and could serve as a premise for 
resilience governance thinking.  
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14 Flockhart (2006). 
15 Sadiki (2016, p. 338). 
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Conclusion 
 
Why is this understanding of resilience so important? Because it changes the foundations of 
International Relations – as a new analytic of governance: from global to local, and the 
person; and to more cooperative orders of the emergent multi-order world.19 Furthermore, 
we develop a new understanding of how an individual and their communities become more 
self-reliant in their development and better self-organised to meet the challenges and 
pressures of the changing world around them. Resilience as a quality and an analytic of 
governance helps to refocus on “the person” and the role of “local communities”: how best 
they can actualise their inherent strength and turn their capacities into capabilities to make 
social systems at all levels more responsive to their needs and a life worth living for. How to 
do it through resilience is, however, another matter, which I am certain, will be an enduring 
and exciting pursuit.  
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DONIYOR KURBANOV1 – Uzbekistan’s new regional policy: 
Implications for international cooperation in wider Eurasia 
 
Introduction  
 
The contemporary foreign policy of Uzbekistan has been rapidly evolving since 2017 in 
accordance with dynamic shifts in the world and the region, as well as large-scale internal 
transformations and the opening of the economy and the country as a whole. 
 
Promoting the country's foreign economic interests has become the number one task: 
increasing exports, attracting foreign investment and advanced technologies, improving the 
country's transport and transit situation, and developing tourism. 
 
Uzbekistan’s regional cooperation 
 
The main priority of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy is a comprehensive improvement of relations 
with the countries of Central Asia, the promotion of effective collaboration in strengthening 
security and stability, and the development of regional cooperation. Over the past three 
years, breakthrough results have been achieved in this direction, including tremendous 
progress in resolving border problems and opening borders, enhancing cross-border trade 
and humanitarian exchange. All this made it possible to increase the level of mutual trust, 
improve the political atmosphere and strengthen stability in Central Asia, intensify trade and 
economic cooperation, and move on to the formation of a new regional cooperation agenda. 
 
The most important achievement of this process of regional rapprochement was the launch 
on the initiative of the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev of the mechanism of 
Consultative Meetings of Heads of State of the region, the first of which was held in March 
2018 in Astana, Kazakhstan. 
 
Along with this, the most important task of foreign policy and foreign economic activity is the 
formation of a multifaceted system of strategic partnerships and cooperation with leading 
countries in the world and with international organisations, designed to provide an effective 
solution to the problems of modernising the economy, maintaining stability and security, and 
creating favourable conditions for regional cooperation. In this regard, the Head of State 
made high-profile visits to Russia, China, the USA and a number of leading European 
countries, to Korea and India. Negotiations on an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement with the EU are ongoing. A visit of the leader of Uzbekistan to Japan is planned 
for December 2020. 
 
In addition, Uzbek multilateral diplomacy has intensified significantly. In almost all 
international organisations and forums to which the Uzbek side is a participant, Tashkent has 
come forward with vigorous initiatives to develop cooperation. The number of events of 
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various multilateral structures held in Uzbekistan has sharply increased. In the coming years, 
it is also planned to hold CIS and SCO summits in Uzbekistan. 
 
It should also be noted that a significant intensification of foreign economic activity and 
economic diplomacy of Uzbekistan has taken place. First of all, Tashkent declared its desire 
to accelerate WTO accession. Cooperation with multilateral development banks has 
intensified, including with the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Islamic Development 
Bank, and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Cooperation with the EBRD has been 
restored and is successfully advancing. 
 
Central Asia as a hub in Eurasian cooperation 
 
The above-mentioned foreign policy and foreign economic priorities and shifts became the 
basis for Tashkent’s active participation in the development of broad cooperation in Eurasia, 
for which Central Asia is a key geopolitical hub. 
 
First of all, Uzbekistan, like other Central Asian states, is interested in the active development 
of Eurasian interconnectivity, which is not possible without a deeper involvement of Central 
Asia in existing and newly emerging transport and logistics links and corridors. Uzbekistan 
actively supports and is ready to participate in specific projects for the implementation of 
various international initiatives and strategies for the development of interconnectivity, 
including the Chinese “Belt and Road Initiative”, the EU Strategy for Connecting Europe and 
Asia, the Korean “New Northern Policy”, Japan’s Quality Infrastructure Initiative, etc. 
 
At the same time, the Uzbek side attaches great importance to the development of 
interconnectivity in all azimuths, both from East to West, and from North to South. Great 
prospects for improving the transport and transit potential of Uzbekistan and the entire region 
are associated with the creation and development of transport corridors in the direction of 
South Asia and the Persian Gulf. In this regard, Tashkent advocates the intensification of 
transportation in accordance with the Ashgabat agreement (“Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-
Oman” transport corridor) and the creation of trans-Afghan corridors, the construction of the 
“Mazar-i-Sharif-Herat” and “Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar” railways. The development of 
the North-South Transport Corridor, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, and 
other projects contributing to the overall strengthening of the transit potential of the Central 
Asian region and Eurasia as a whole are also in the interest of Central Asian states. 
 
Secondly, the multilateral formats of interaction of the countries of the region with a number 
of non-regional partners in the “Central Asia Plus” format (with the EU, Russia, the USA, 
Japan and South Korea), can contribute to enhancing the role of Uzbekistan and the entire 
Central Asian region in developing cooperation in Eurasia. At the beginning of this year, on 
the initiative of the Uzbek side, the first ministerial meeting of the India-Central Asia Dialogue 
with the participation of Afghanistan was held in Samarkand. The Uzbek side is also a 
supporter of a more active involvement of Afghanistan in regional trade and economic 
relations, in general, in peaceful interaction in the Eurasian space. The 8th Regional 
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Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA) is planned to be held in 
Uzbekistan next year.  
 
Thirdly, the significant potential of the industrial development of Uzbekistan determined 
Tashkent’s desire to more actively integrate into global and interregional supply chains, 
which may contribute to more productive involvement of other Central Asian countries in 
Eurasian production, cooperation, technological and commercial ties. In this regard, 
selective, targeted development of cooperation ties with the economic regions of Russia, 
China, India, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Turkey, Iran, etc., surrounding 
Uzbekistan and Central Asia may be of particular interest. 
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RUSTAM MAKHMUDOV44 - EU-Central Asia cooperation 
after the adoption of the new EU regional strategy 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The EU’s new Central Asia strategy addresses all the traditional key dimensions of its 
foreign policy: the measurement of economy, politics and security, as well as the 
measurement of soft power (values and education). In addition, new points were added 
to the 2019 strategy, such as the issue of connectivity, EU-Central Asia cooperation in 
the field of digitalisation of the economy and the use of the European satellite navigation 
system Gallileo. Of course, as a text, the strategy is drawn up very professionally. 
However, if we consider it from a practical point of view, the question arises as to whether 
the new EU strategy on Central Asia will repeat the fate of the previous strategy of 2007, 
which many European and American experts working in Central Asia have called the 
"declaration of intent”? 
 
So, what is the likelihood that the new strategy will overcome the level of the declaration 
of intent and become more productive? In this paper, I will not analyse the EU strategy 
by points, but I want to go the other way, namely, to propose certain basic criteria and 
parameters, and through them to determine how viable the new strategy will be. 
 
Economic cooperation and (inter)dependence 
 
The proposed basic parameter is the influence of the strategy on the further quantitative 
and qualitative development of trade and economic cooperation. It should be noted that 
there is still a significant imbalance, which directly affects the dynamics of European-
Central Asian relations. While for the Central Asian states the European Union is a very 
important factor in foreign trade and investment, for the European Union the role of 
Central Asia in the structure of foreign trade is very small. In figures, it looks like this: the 
EU accounts for 30% of the foreign trade of Central Asian countries and 62 billion euros 
of direct investment in the region. In turn, the share of Central Asia in EU foreign trade is 
less than 1%. 
 
For comparison, of the total EU foreign trade, which amounted to almost 4 trillion euros 
in 2018, more than 673 billion fell to the United States, more than 604 billion euros to 
China, and trade with Switzerland constituted 265 billion euros45. Next comes Russia with 
253 billion euros. Despite the imposition of mutual restrictive sanctions, in 2018 Russia 
                                                     
44 Independent researcher 
45 The European Union and its trade partners. Fact Sheets on the European Union European Parliament.  
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/160/the-european-union-and-its-trade-partners 
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held the fourth place as the largest partner in the field of export of goods and the third 
place in the field of import46. 
 
Naturally, the EU’s attention to the development of economic cooperation with these 
countries will be much higher than to Central Asia. This is just an objective reality. 
However, I do not think this is a verdict. A statement that Central Asia is less important 
only raises another question about how the EU and Central Asian countries can increase 
the volume and quality of trade and economic ties and how. 
 
Low versus high added value goods 
 
To answer this question about increased economic cooperation, it is necessary to assess 
two areas through which Central Asian countries can increase their exports to the EU. 
This is an assessment of the potential for increasing the export of raw materials and goods 
with low added value from Central Asia to the EU, as well as an assessment of the 
prospects for exporting goods with high added value. 
 
If we talk about the potential of increasing the supply of raw materials and goods with low 
added value, then three countries with similar potential can be noted in the region, namely 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan may increase exports, primarily 
of oil and other types of mineral resources to the EU. Kazakhstan’s export consists for 
80% of oil and gas, and Nur-Sultan’s plans include increasing oil exports to 90 million 
tons in 2020 and 100 million tons by 2024.  
 
Uzbekistan, in turn, has great potential for increasing supplies of agricultural and textile 
products. By 2030, it is planned to increase agricultural exports to 20 billion dollars, and 
textiles to 7 billion dollars by 2025. An incentive for Uzbekistan to increase supplies to the 
EU may be the former’s receipt of an EU Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP+) 
status. 
 
As for Turkmenistan, it has the greatest potential for increasing its exports to the EU in 
the gas sector, but subject to the solution of the problem with transportation routes. The 
EU’s New Central Asia Strategy states that the EU will continue its efforts to build the 
Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. But I believe that this project can so far be attributed to the 
sphere of geopolitical idealism. A more realistic project is cooperation with Gazprom or 
Iran on the development and implementation of schemes for the supply of Turkmen gas 
to the European market, but for this it is necessary to resolve the existing geopolitical 
contradictions between the West on the one hand and Russia and Iran on the other. 
 
If we talk about the potential for increasing the export of goods and technologies with high 
added value from Central Asia to the EU, then the current potential of Central Asian 
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countries is very low, since Europe itself is the largest world technological centre and 
exporter of goods with high added value, technologies and services. 
 
The need for technology and innovation  
 
Thus, we can see a certain potential for increasing the volume of Central Asian exports 
to the EU so far only for raw materials and goods with low added value. There are both 
positive and negative points to this. The positive point is that in general, the volume and 
value of exports from Central Asia can grow, and under favourable conditions, increase 
the flow of necessary currency. The negative aspect is of a more long-term nature, and 
consists of further consolidating the Central Asian countries in the niche of suppliers of 
raw materials and goods with low added value. Due to a further increase in the share of 
raw materials in exports, Central Asian countries risk missing the moment to enter the 
fourth industrial revolution, which will leave them on the side-lines of another global 
redistribution of wealth and influence. 
 
In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, they have already begun to understand this, as attempts 
to launch innovative transition and catch-up development programmes in the field of high 
technologies show. These programmes include cooperation with China (G5, smart and 
safe cities), Russia (atomic station) and South Korea (smart cities). The innovation 
transition programmes of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan set, as it seems to me, two 
ambitious goals. First, they aim not just to import modern equipment, but to create their 
own scientific and technological base on the principles of the fourth industrial revolution. 
Second, relying on such scientific and technological base, they work to create their own 
relatively independent production base and start producing a new generation of high 
value-added goods. 
 
Against this background, another question arises: Is the EU ready to participate in the 
creation of a new generation of scientific, technological and industrial bases in order to 
qualitatively and quantitatively change its trade and economic relations with Central Asia? 
Along with the transport and energy component, the EU’s strategy also has a digital and 
technological component, Digital4development, which is associated with the European 
‘digital for development policy’. The fact that the new EU strategy spells out attention to 
cooperation in the field of digitalisation and support for start-ups and business 
accelerators can be regarded as a very positive step. However, how substantial will EU 
participation really be? I think that one of the answers to this question lies in the intention 
and readiness of the European Union to build its Eurasian and global technological zone. 
Here, I will consider this question from a strategic and conceptual point of view, without 
touching upon the financial dimension yet.  
 
Other regional integration initiatives 
 
Today we can say that this EU strategy will intersect with the Chinese Belt and Road 
Initiative and the Eurasian Economic Union, which can be regarded as the Chinese and 
Russian strategies for building their technological zones. How will this intersection 
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develop? The EU strategy states that “Europe will work closely with third countries, 
regional organizations and international financial institutions to promote sustainability,” 
but it’s hard to say how the situation really will turn out. The scenario of rivalry with third 
countries cannot be ruled out. We see the rivalry of Europe and Russia in the space of 
countries of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. We also see increased technological 
rivalry between the US and China, accompanied by higher import tariffs, restrictions on 
technology transfer and the creation of blacklisted companies. Whether the European 
strategy will go along the path of conjugation or along the path of rivalry will become a 
crucial issue both for determining the nature and quality of future cooperation between 
Central Asia and the EU. 
 
The success of such directions of the New EU Strategy for Central Asia as cooperation 
in the field of education, and environmental and water sustainability, will also largely 
depend on the change in the quality of the European technological and investment 
presence in Central Asia. The problem of the region is that the majority of environmental 
and water problems are generated and continue to be generated by economic models 
and energy-, resource- and water-inefficient technologies that are outdated. For instance, 
take cars with internal combustion engines that are currently responsible for urban air 
pollution, or obsolete types of thermal power plants, or obsolete irrigation models in 
agriculture, which lose 40 to 60% of the water used. Outdated urban governance models 
and erratic development also lead to environmental degradation in cities. A high-quality 
solution to these problems requires new, more modern development models, 
technologies, knowledge and the quality of human capital, and the EU could potentially 
become one of the external players that can provide all this and become one of the key 
beneficiaries. 
 
Conclusion 
 
So, concluding, it should be noted that the success of the new EU strategy will largely 
depend on whether the EU can fully fit into the modernisation programmes of the 
countries of Central Asia and, first of all, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and open its market 
for future high-tech products. The distinction of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan is explained 
by the fact that these are the largest economies in the region and their successful 
transition to a new type of economy can become a catalyst for the development of all of 
Central Asia. If the EU cannot write off these processes, or the Central Asian countries 
themselves cannot carry out accelerated modernisation, both of these factors will 
increase the likelihood that the new EU strategy, like its predecessor, will remain at the 
level of a declaration of intent.  
HAROUN MIR1 – An outlook for a sustainable peace in 
Afghanistan 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The utmost desire of Afghans is a lasting and sustainable peace, which has remained a 
distant dream in the past four decades. The collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001 followed 
by the re-engagement of the international community through the “Bonn Process”2 in 
December 2001, led to a renewed hope and opportunity for Afghanistan to re-emerge from 
the ashes of the civil war and reintegrate into the world community. Despite the support of 
the international community and particularly generous financial and military assistance from 
the United States and its NATO allies, the resurgence of the Taliban in 2006 has seriously 
undermined the process of state building in the country.    
 
Past peace attempts, which were first started by former president Hamid Karzai in 20103 and 
were continued by President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani after his election 2014,4 have failed. 
In fact, President Ghani has developed a twofold peace strategy consisting of rapprochement 
with Pakistan and direct negotiations with the Taliban. He began his new initiative by visiting 
Beijing and Riyadh which are considered key allies of Pakistan in the region. He then made 
a number of concessions to the Pakistani authorities such as accepting an unprecedented 
trip to the Pakistan Army General Headquarter, sending Afghan cadets to their military 
academies, and allowing the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding for intelligence 
sharing between the two countries.  
 
However, these unilateral concessions were not reciprocated by the Pakistani authorities. 
Despite a brief ceasefire for the Islamic holidays of Eid-ul-Fitr  in 20185 and the release of 
some of the Taliban prisoners, the Taliban have refused to recognise the legitimacy of the 
National Unity Government and thus categorically rejected its olive branch.  
 
Meanwhile, the recent direct negotiations between the United States and the Taliban have 
created a new momentum for the peace process, which has gained widespread support 
among Afghanistan’s major stakeholders.  
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In addition, President Ghani has offered a new comprehensive seven point peace plan6 
centered on direct negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban; but which 
also emphasised the importance of a regional consensus. 
 
Therefore, Afghanistan is in dire need of an honest and trustworthy regional mediator, which 
is capable of bringing together Afghanistan’s neighbours and key regional powers in the 
context of this new peace initiative.  
 
The past regional efforts in bringing stability in Afghanistan 
 
The Obama administration, through Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, adopted a regional 
approach for resolution of conflict in Afghanistan. In fact, by appointing late Richard 
Holbrooke as Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Obama 
administration wanted to galvanise regional dialogue in view of an ultimate political 
settlement between the Afghan government and the insurgents. The most important 
diplomatic initiative of the Obama Administration was the Istanbul Process,7 also known as 
the “Heart of Asia,” which has been perhaps the best approach for reaching an unequivocal 
consensus on regional cooperation for a secure and stable Afghanistan. However, since the 
inception of this dialogue among Afghanistan near and extended neighbours and supporting 
countries in 2011, so far nine annual meetings have been organised but the outcome of the 
meetings has yet to materialise in any significant way because the process has been 
undermined by growing tensions among key regional stakeholders.  
 
Similarly, the Quadrilateral Coordination Group, (QGC)8 composed of Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
China, and United States, which held its first meeting in Islamabad in 2016, has also faded 
away.  
 
In fact, unsuccessful attempts through the Istanbul Process and the QGC indicates that, 
despite continuous efforts, reaching a regional consensus on Afghanistan is a hugely 
challenging exercise. 
 
In need of renewed regional dialogue 
 
As stated in President Ghani’s new peace strategy for Afghanistan, the conflict in Afghanistan 
is multifaceted, which requires different approaches to its different components. The US-
Taliban dialogue will continue and the intra-Afghan dialogue might soon start, there is thus 
imminent need for renewed regional dialogue. 
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We will not be able to achieve lasting peace and stability in Afghanistan without addressing 
all major components of the conflict in Afghanistan including the concerns of Afghanistan’s 
neighbours. Therefore, in view of past failed attempts, it is necessary to bring Afghanistan’s 
neighbours and regional powers back into a dialogue similar to the “Six Plus Two Group on 
Afghanistan.9 In addition, India must be added in this group, which will make it Six Plus Three.  
 
In order to reinitiate a regional dialogue on Afghanistan, there needs to be a trustworthy and 
an impartial mediator, who could enjoy the trust and respect of all regional stakeholders, 
including the Afghan government and the Taliban.  
 
Among all regional stakeholders, Uzbekistan is perhaps the most desirable country to take 
the lead on regional dialogue on Afghanistan. Uzbekistan would serve as a comfortable and 
easily accessible place for all of Afghanistan’s neighbours and thus would be best suited for 
an exercise like this. In addition, a Taliban delegation recently traveled to Samarkand and 
met with Uzbek officials, which has provided the Uzbek authorities a special mediation role 
in the current political context.  
 
How to address the challenge of Pakistan? 
 
One of the important underlying sources of conflict in Afghanistan has been the tenuous 
relationship with Pakistan since the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. Pakistan’s 
powerful military has supported and used armed opposition groups in Afghanistan in order 
to achieve strategic depth inside the country through a subservient government in Kabul. 
Their policy of destabilising Afghanistan and undermining the central government goes back 
to pre-1980s, and in the past 18 years they have been able to successfully withstand all kind 
of pressure from the US and NATO countries and never gave up on the Taliban. This is 
because they have heavily invested in them, and they are keen to extract advantages from 
the Afghan government before they could make any tangible concession towards peace and 
stability in Afghanistan.10 
 
The demands of Pakistan are very clear and they have communicated them directly and 
indirectly to the Afghan authorities in the past few years. They are namely: 
 
1. Recognition of the Durand Line as de facto international border between the two 
countries, 
2. Pakistan’s right over the Kunar River, 
3. Reduced presence of India in Afghanistan, 
4. Privileged access to Afghanistan’s mineral resources, 
5. And unrestricted access to Central Asian markets via Afghanistan. 
                                                     
9 “HIGH-LEVEL MEETING OF ‘SIX PLUS TWO’ GROUP ON AFGHANISTAN | Meetings Coverage and Press 
Releases.” United Nations, United Nations,  
https://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990923.sgsm7144.doc.html. 
10 Mir, Haroun. “When Will Pakistan's Military Leadership Gain Political Wisdom?: Opinion.” Asia Times, 5 Sept. 
2018, https://www.asiatimes.com/2018/09/opinion/when-will-pakistans-military-leadership-gain-political-
wisdom/.  
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The Afghan political elite is fully aware of Pakistan’s demands. However, embarking on 
serious negotiation with Pakistan on these highly politicised and controversial topics requires 
a strong political mandate and unequivocal support from the broad political spectrum in the 
country. In turn, this kind of broad internal consensus requires a strong government in Kabul 
with a solid mandate. Therefore, President Ghani has rightly said that before reaching out to 
the Taliban, he must find a common understanding with Pakistan.  
 
The position of the Taliban and their internal issues 
 
The Taliban, despite their territorial gains, face deep crises. The absence of a charismatic 
leadership and lack of a clear message about their end-goal in the context of a potential 
dialogue with the Afghan government has created difficulties for them. In addition, the 
unexpected internal split and direct confrontation in the aftermath of the announcement of 
the death of Mullah Omar in 201511 has created deep scars inside the movement. 
 
Meanwhile, the threat of vigorous competition from Islamic State (IS) in the country looms 
high, and they have risked losing the monopoly over religion to this new emerging 
movement.12 Lately some of the foreign fighters in the country have shifted their allegiance 
from the Taliban to the Islamic State.  
 
In addition, the Taliban have relied on new sources of funding and military support particularly 
from Iran and Russia,13 which has further contributed to their internal split and fragmentation.  
 
Furthermore, today’s situation in Afghanistan is drastically different from that in the 1990s 
and it is not anymore an isolated and fragmented country. The Taliban must recognise that 
their return to power by force is impossible, and there is no viable alternative to the current 
democratic political process in the country. 
 
Also, the Taliban movement’s archaic message does not resonate with Afghanistan’s young 
and growing urban population. The movement’s top leadership is afraid that political 
compromise in a democratic system will marginalise them, and they might face the fate of 
the former Mujahideen leaders post-2001. In fact, during the Bonn Conference in 2001 more 
than 50% of top government positions went to various Mujahideen leaders but over the past 
decade most of them have either retired or become marginalised. 
 
                                                     
11 Goldstein, Joseph, and Taimoor Shah. “Death of Mullah Omar Exposes Divisions Within Taliban.” The New 
York Times, The New York Times, 30 July 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/31/world/asia/taliban-
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Divergence of Interest among Afghanistan’s neighbours and regional powers? 
 
Since 2012, the new political development in the Middle East; growing rivalries between 
Pakistan and India; and the United States’ worsening relationship with Russia and China 
have negatively impacted regional cooperation on Afghanistan. Despite high stakes for 
regional security, Afghanistan’s regional stakeholders continue to dwell over their divergent 
interests rather than cooperate in bringing peace and stability in this war-torn country. There 
have been ample analyses on regional approaches for peace and stability in Afghanistan 
and in the region. In an essay in 2010 for Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, titled 
“Is a Regional Policy Viable in Afghanistan?”, I assessed the role of Afghanistan’s neighbours 
and key regional stakeholders, and wrote: 
 
An ideal regional approach must explore common opportunities rather than dwell on 
differences. There will be some impediments to the process, however Some of the objectives 
of Afghanistan’s neighbors and other regional countries conflict with one another, and have 
contributed to instability.14 
 
Recently, the proxy confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Middle East has 
already spilled over in Afghanistan. The presence of a large number of Afghan Shiite fighters 
in support of Iran’s effort in Syria, and the emergence of IS fighters in Afghanistan is a prelude 
for sectarian violence in the country.   
 
In reaction to Saudi Arabia’s persistence to enroll Afghanistan in its Sunni coalition against 
Iran, I wrote in an Op-ed for Al Jazeera English in April 2015: 
 
The future stability of Afghanistan rests on Ghani and the National Unity Government's 
decision. Taking part in the Yemen ground invasion would cause the unraveling of 
Afghanistan's unity government and a harsh reaction from Iran. Refusing to become a part 
of the wider Sunni coalition would cost Kabul the peace process and political isolation from 
the Saudi-led coalition.15  
 
Meanwhile, Pakistan’s obsession about India’s presence in Afghanistan hasn’t changed, and 
therefore its military establishment considers radical militant groups such as the Haqani 
Network as a strategic asset against New Delhi’s growing influence in Kabul. 
 
In addition, China’s recent direct engagement in Afghanistan and its support for the Afghan 
government is not in concertation with the US and NATO’s efforts to stabilise the country, 
and instead it is viewed as part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s efforts to counter 
NATO’s influence in Eurasia. 
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Similarly, Russia has recently adopted a hostile position vis-à-vis the US and NATO’s military 
presence in Afghanistan by providing financial, military, and diplomatic support to the 
Taliban.  
 
Therefore, for China and Russia the top priority is US and NATO’s military exit from 
Afghanistan even at the cost of political stability in the country.  
 
Conclusion 
 
There is a consensus and unanimity inside Afghanistan and among its key stakeholders that 
the only solution to achieve enduring peace in the country is through an ultimate political 
settlement, which will allow Afghanistan to live in peace with itself and with its neighbours. 
 
Afghanistan has suffered from belligerent interferences from its neighbours, particularly 
Pakistan and Iran, and this must stop because a failed Afghan state is a liability for the entire 
region. 
 
Perhaps, it is the last opportunity to achieve a peaceful resolution to the Afghan conflict while 
they still enjoy military and financial assistance from the US and its NATO allies. However, a 
hasty US military withdrawal from Afghanistan will create a vacuum of power, which might 
not be filled immediately and easily by any other regional power or even coalition of regional 
countries.   
 
A majority of Afghans believe, while the intra-Afghan dialogue is necessary, a regional 
consensus among Afghanistan’s neighbours and regional powers will be the only guarantee 
to preserve the eventual accords and create proper mechanisms to mend Afghanistan’s 
relationship with its neighbours and particularly address historical differences with Pakistan. 
 
Perhaps, Uzbekistan is best placed among Afghanistan’s neighbours to lead a regional 
dialogue on Afghanistan as an important supplement to the intra-Afghan dialogue between 
the Afghan government and the Taliban.  
IRINA PETROVA1 - The European Union’s evolving approach 
towards governance in Central Eurasia 
 
 
Introduction: European Union’s policy towards Central Eurasia at a crossroads 
 
A series of internal and external crises has had a profound impact on the European Union’s (EU) 
foreign policy in the past years. While after the Ukraine crisis and the launch of the Chinese Belt 
and Road Initiative (BRI) it has become obvious that the EU’s foreign policy in its eastern 
neighbourhood required a new approach, what would be the new approach has been a much more 
debated issue. Interviews conducted with representatives of the European External Action Service, 
the European Commission and the European Parliament show different degrees of the EU 
bureaucracy’s readiness and/or willingness for a paradigm shift in its foreign policy. This paper will 
argue that the direction in which the new EU approach is unfolding is inspired by complexity theory. 
Yet, whereas the new policy trends are inspired by complexity thinking, in practice the change has 
been very incremental. As a result, one wonders to what extent the EU’s policy gets revised and 
is actually shaped by complexity thinking in practice, that is, beyond policy rhetoric?       
 
Complexity thinking, resilience and International Relations   
 
Complexity theory emerged in natural sciences in the beginning of the 20th century to make sense 
of complex systems and was adopted by public policy studies and broader social sciences scholars 
since the 1970s onwards. The theory presented a radical ontological and epistemological shift from 
the Enlightenment paradigm of thinking. Thus, whereas the Enlightenment way of thinking saw the 
world as consisting of simple and complicated systems, functioning based on linear causality, and 
developing progressively; the complexity thinking focused on complex systems (i.e. systems that 
cannot be studied as a sum of their parts) and non-linear causality.2 It is important to highlight 
some foundations of complexity thinking in order to understand how the EU tries to employ it in 
practice.  
 
First, it is argued that complex life is characterised by a multiplicity of actors. In International 
Relations this has been reflected by the rise of Transnationalism in the 1970s, which pointed out 
that international interactions are carried out not only by governments, but also by a whole 
constellation of various types of actors, such as parliaments, civil society organisations, non-
governmental organisations, ethnic and religious groups, trans-national corporations etc. These 
actors might act on their own or as parts of larger networks. The phenomenon of interaction of 
multiple networks (quite often of different nature) has been labelled as ‘multiplexity’. 
 
                                                     
1 Postdoctoral Research Associate, GCRF UKRI 'COMPASS' project, University of Kent. Contact: i.petrova-
217@kent.ac.uk 
2 Koliba et. al. (2016) “Complexity Theory and Systems Analysis”. In: Ansell, C. and Torfing, J. (eds.) Handbook on 
Theories of Governance, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 364-379 
 
40 
 
Second, complex systems are characterised by iterative adaptations and non-linearity (a 
relationship that cannot be explicated as a linear combination of its inputs). That implies that 
although we can anticipate certain challenges, the realm of ‘unknown unknowns’ is rather broad, 
which means that often we are confronted with challenges that we could not foresee. In this 
respect, the only way to survive is to learn from the ongoing developments and adapt to them. 
 
Third, an essential feature of complexity is emergence. Emergence can be defined as “the fact that 
the individual interaction level produces social effects at the macro level, which are not reducible 
to the aggregate alone”.3 Hence, the central idea is that collective order may develop from below 
as a result of self-organisation requiring no central control.4 This characteristic of systems coupled 
with uncertainty and our inability to predict potential challenges, resulted in conceptualising 
resilience as a new “postmodern form of governance…which asserts a flatter ontology of 
interactive emergence where the knowledge which needs to be acquired can only be gained 
through self-reflexive approaches”.5   
 
Such understanding of resilience suggests that in the context of complex life and ‘unknown 
unknowns’, (external) governance should be about reliance of everyday practices, internal 
structures and interactions, which is expected to result in self-organisation and finding the 
responses most suitable and sustainable for the community in question. In view of external 
governance, this perspective of resilience-based governance would imply rejection of imposition 
and neoliberal governmentality.6 
 
Complexity thinking in the EU’s evolving approach towards governance  
in Central Eurasia 
 
As follows from the discussion above, complex life implies an inability to predict potential 
challenges and developments. Hence, unpredictability also feeds in into uncontrollability. The 2016 
European Union Global Strategy has indeed recognised that the EU might deal with a world that 
is unpredictable and uncontrollable.7 Yet, what does it mean in terms of the EU’s governance in its 
eastern neighbourhood? 2016 saw some changes in the cornerstone foreign policy principles.  
 
First and foremost, one of the major innovations is the embracement of the concept of resilience. 
While there are many sceptics seeing resilience as yet another European jargonism, there is also 
some evidence that the concept of resilience is taken seriously by a share of the EU foreign policy 
makers as a new governance paradigm. Secondly, adoption of complexity thinking and resilience 
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as a mode of governance triggers a shift of responsibility from the EU to the partner states.8 This, 
at least partially, implies a less top-down and a more bottom-up approach. Thirdly, adoption of 
resilience also implies increased focus on the local and, by extension, greater local ownership. 
Finally, complexity thinking entails the process of constant learning. While complex life means that 
there are many potential challenges which fall under the ‘unknown unknowns’ category, the only 
way to survive and prosper is iterative adaptation to the emerging challenges. The principle of 
iterative adaptations has been embraced by the European Union. In what follows, I will discuss in 
more detail how these principles have been applied by the EU in its foreign policy towards its 
eastern neighbourhood.  
 
Iterative adaptions regarding the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood 
 
In terms of iterative adaptations, the EU has demonstrated substantial reflexivity by initiating a 
wide-scale consultation process including broad audiences both in the European Union and 
partner countries. Launched after the Arab Spring, the mechanism of public consultations has been 
recalibrated through several iterations to ensure a wider participation.  
 
Another important policy change reflecting the embracement of complexity and resilience thinking 
is the differentiation among the partners and rejection of the one-size-fit-all approach applied 
previously. This, for instance, resulted in various framework agreements including Association 
Agreements, Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement, Partnership Priorities with 
Belarus, EU-Kazakhstan Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, etc.  
 
Furthermore, partnership priorities are now based on broader negotiations and consultations at the 
agenda-setting and policy formulation stages of the policy cycle. The European Union seems to 
be getting more conscious not to impose its own agenda onto its partners (to what extent it has 
succeeded so far is a different question, however).  
 
Analysis of the partnership priorities shows that their language is getting less patronising as 
compared to the Action Plans that were adopted previously. Finally, it is important to note that the 
EU’s policy evaluation has been revised to ensure greater differentiation. In particular, while 
previously the ENP country reports were prepared based on a single template for the same 
deadline, the current procedure ensures that the policy evaluation documents are only published 
when a certain policy cycle is completed and the evaluation criteria reflect partnership priorities, 
and hence vary from one state to another.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This analysis of recent developments has shown that these changes signal a shift in the EU foreign 
policy towards resilience as a mode of governance in the eastern neighbourhood. Yet, these 
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changes need to be developed further in order to show an in-depth policy change.9 There is 
definitely a drive towards a new governance paradigm, yet a range of factors hinders resilience as 
self-governance. First, such understanding of resilience is only one of several ways to understand 
it. Another rather common approach is seeing resilience just as an ability to bounce back after 
crisis. Second, and connected to this, the EU’s foreign policy in the neighbourhood is very path-
dependant and changes are rather slow and incremental. Yet, as argued in the introduction, the 
change is inspired by complexity thinking and, in my view, a move in the right direction.  
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VICTOR SHADURSKI10 – Belarusian-Uzbek relations: 
achievements and perspectives 
 
Introduction 
 
For a deeper understanding of the place and role of the post-Soviet space in global and 
regional politics, we need to study not only the potential of the Russian Federation and the 
interstate integration associations, created with its leadership (CIS, EAEU, CSTO, Union 
State of Belarus and Russia), but also the factor of bilateral relations of other young states 
that arose after the collapse of the USSR. One such significant interstate relationship in 
Eurasia is between Belarus (Eastern Europe) and Uzbekistan (Central Asia) with ever 
increasing mutual interests.   
Despite the considerable distance (it takes 3365 kilometers to get from Minsk to Tashkent), 
different climatic conditions, cultural as well as religious background; the two countries and 
nations have much in common. First of all, we should remember that both nations were part 
of the Russian Empire and following that the Soviet Union. We jointly experienced 
achievements and tragedies: World War I, World War II, the earthquake in Tashkent (26 
April, 1966); and the Chernobyl accident and its aftermath (26 April 1986), among other 
examples. 
 
During World War II, the Uzbek SSR hosted tens of thousands of evacuated Belarusian 
people. Among them was an out-standing Belarusian poet and writer Yakub Kolas. In 
Tashkent, one of the central streets was named after him, and a monument was constructed 
to commemorate him. In Belarus the heroic son of the Uzbek nation, Gulyam Yakubov has 
been commemorated. As a tribute of respect to him, one of the streets of Minsk bears his 
name. Moreover, a bust of the prominent Uzbek poet Alisher Navoi (1441–1501) was built in 
the center of the Belarusian capital. 
 
In Soviet times, a strong mutually beneficial inter-republic cooperation existed which was 
based on intensive deliveries of tractors, trucks, refrigerators and other products from 
Belarus to Uzbekistan. At the same time, large-scale deliveries of cotton and cotton products, 
fresh and dry fruits, etc. were exported from Uzbekistan into Belarus. 
 
Belarus-Uzbek relations since independence 
 
However, in the first two and a half decades of independence of these ‘young’ states, bilateral 
relations did not have a positive dynamic, due to various reasons. The countries’ leaders met 
predominantly in multilateral formats (the UN, CIS and SCO). The Embassy of Uzbekistan in 
Minsk was opened only in April 2018 and a small embassy of Belarus in Uzbekistan had 
existed since February 1994. Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s election as President of Uzbekistan, in 
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December 2016, gave a serious impulse for the development of Belarusian-Uzbek relations. 
Mirziyoyev announced a policy of openness and expansion of international cooperation. 
 
This positive signal from Tashkent was received with enthusiasm in Belarus. In 2017, two 
assembly plants of Belarusian machinery with the participation of the Belarusian capital were 
launched on the territory of the Republic of Uzbekistan, namely the  joint ventures, ’Amkodor-
Agrotexmash’ and ’UzBelAgromash’. In 2018, shoe manufacturing company “UzShoes” 
opened a plant as well. During President Lukashenko’s visit to Uzbekistan on 13-14 
September 2018, 19 agreements were signed to create a solid legal basis for bilateral 
cooperation in the political, socio-economic and cultural-humanitarian spheres. The 
Presidents of Belarus and Uzbekistan opened a new factory for the assembly of machinery 
named ’Amkodor’ in Tashkent. In total, over 50 joint ventures with Belarusian investments 
operate in Uzbekistan (Aripov 2019). On 2 November 2018, the Prime Ministers of the two 
states signed the ‘Roadmap for the development of cooperation between the two countries 
for 2019–2020’ in Astana (SBBY 2018).  
 
Serious results were also achieved during President Mirziyoyev’s visit to Belarus (31 July - 
1 August 2019). Following negotiations, the Presidents of Belarus and Uzbekistan adopted 
12 joint documents on the development of cooperation in various areas. The Heads of State 
personally signed a joint statement. At the Regions Forum on 29-30 July 2019 in Minsk, 26 
agreements were adopted at the interregional level, as well as about 20 specific commercial 
contracts worth more than 300 million US dollars (Nazarov 2019). 
 
Many politicians and experts note that the rapid development of Belarusian-Uzbek 
cooperation is largely favoured by good personal relations between the leaders of the two 
states, which is important for the domestic and foreign policies of both countries. In addition 
to President Lukashenko’s statements on the topic of privileged cooperation with Uzbekistan, 
Mikhail Myasnikovich (Chairman of the Council of the Republic of the National Assembly of 
Belarus and currently the Head of the Eurasian Economic Commission) repeatedly 
expressed the same vision. During a meeting with a delegation from Uzbekistan, in 2018, he 
said that “Uzbekistan is a key partner in Central Asia” (Council of the Republic of the National 
Assembly of Belarus 2018). 
 
Priorities for future cooperation  
 
Assessing the high potential of bilateral cooperation, I would like to highlight four possible 
areas of interaction. 
 
1. Identify mutually beneficial areas of economic cooperation and cooperation with 
third parties.  
It is important to stress that Uzbekistan’s choice of Belarus as a ‘reference point’ in Eastern 
Europe, and the use of Uzbekistan as the preferred platform for Belarus’ presence in Central 
Asia does not mean that Minsk and Tashkent reject a multi-vector foreign policy and/or 
multilateral cooperation. However, bilateral agreements might prove most effective and 
predictable. 
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We should also be aware of the fact that the status of a ’reference point’ requires not only 
constant attention, but also significant funding from both states. In this case, the center of 
gravity should be transferred to investments on the creation of joint ventures. As mentioned 
before, the President of Uzbekistan emphasized the complementary nature of the two 
economies, which forms an objective basis for trade expansion. The leadership of the 
countries set the task of increasing mutual trade up to 1 billion US dollars. However, bilateral 
trade and even the creation of joint industries will not solve the economic problems of the 
two countries without joint access to the markets of third countries. 
 
For Belarus, it is essential to expand the supply of machinery products and other goods to 
the markets of the so-called “far arc” countries (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and others). This 
requires a convenient and inexpensive transport infrastructure. Can Tashkent provide 
assistance here? Uzbekistan can build cross-border railways and highways leading to the 
Indian Ocean, which Belarus could take advantage of. In return, Belarus is the best logistics 
platform for Uzbek exports and jointly produced goods to enter the European Union market. 
 
In bilateral cooperation, Belarus and Uzbekistan can make greater use of the opportunities 
arising from the implementation of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI offers 
prospects for a more efficient operation of transport corridors leading from the northeastern 
provinces of China to Central and Western Europe. Container trains, after unloading in the 
EU, return to the East almost without cargo. This circumstance can be used in the interests 
of Belarusian-Uzbek trade. 
 
2. Joint efforts to create more favourable external (international) conditions for 
medium and small states. 
At the global and regional level, there are other activities in line with the foreign policy 
objectives of Belarus and Uzbekistan. Recognition of both countries on the global scale can 
be facilitated by mutual support in the world arena; joint initiatives in international 
organisations; and other common events. It would be ideal to implement the slogan “Much 
depends on our countries in the world” by uniting the group of medium and small states in 
one platform.  
 
3. Promote human contacts between citizens of the two countries, especially young 
people. 
Obviously, the cultural and humanitarian sphere plays an important role in the interaction of 
the two countries. It also requires serious financial support. The problem is that establishing 
intensive public relations is a future investment, which often does not bring quick and tangible 
dividends. Festivals, summer schools, student exchanges, student construction brigades, 
and the development of mutual tourism are some such forms of possible cooperation. 
 
A concrete example of student contacts is the joint Belarusian-Uzbek construction brigade 
"Dustlik" ("Friendship"). Young people worked on the beautification of Minsk from 22 July to 
5 August 2019 (MinskNovosti 2019). 
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4. Exchange  experiences in creating an effective model of a transition society. 
It is obvious that both countries are striving to learn from the global experiences in setting up 
a competitive economy; in forming effective state institutions free from corruption; and in the 
nurturing of a constructive civil society. It is unlikely that Minsk and Tashkent could simply 
implement a model of development that was already prepared and tested elsewhere (e.g. in 
China, Russia, or Poland). They have to formulate their own, way of development, taking into 
account best practice, the previously reached progress of their countries, national cultural 
and religious traditions, and other factors. 
 
It should be pointed out that the rapid transformation of Uzbekistan has become a great 
surprise not only in the region, but worldwide. More and more often, world media are 
reporting on an evolving Uzbekistan, and international contacts at the highest level are 
developing rapidly. 
 
In my opinion, the experience of the Uzbek government in reforming state-owned companies, 
including support and profiling of inefficient enterprises and production capacities, should 
trigger great interest among Belarusian practitioners and experts. 
 
It is important here to mention another successful experience of Uzbekistan, which was 
adopted by Belarusian representatives, namely the achievements of the southern country in 
the sphere of international tourism. The simplification of the visa regime and the rules of stay 
in Uzbekistan, along with the development of infrastructure and the promotion of the country's 
tourism potential abroad, led to a twofold increase in the number of foreigners visiting the 
republic - from 2.60 million in 2017 to 5.3 million in 2018 (UzNews 2019).  
 
In addition to almost 70 countries for which Uzbekistan established a visa-free regime, from 
1 February 2019, the possibility of obtaining an electronic entry visa was introduced for 
citizens of 76 other countries. This innovation provides a significant reduction in the time of 
issuance of visas. 
 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belarus Vladimir Makei announced the possibility of 
introducing electronic entry visas in Belarus in July 2019, stating: “As you know, a 30-day 
visa-free regime has been introduced for citizens of almost 80 countries. We do not stop here 
and continue working on further steps. We have prepared the proposals for the government 
on the possible introduction of an electronic visa for third-country nationals”. The Minister 
furthermore expressed hope that this project will be implemented within the next year (SBBY 
2019). 
 
Conclusion  
 
It is obvious that neither Belarus nor Uzbekistan have their own investment funds to launch 
large mutually beneficial projects. In the current economic situation, they depend on the 
support of more powerful states; therefore, they are forced to take into account the 
approaches of the latter. 
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Moreover, the bilateral format of interaction of two small countries that do not have common 
borders can hardly compete with larger integration initiatives (particularly the Eurasian 
Economic Union), as well as with the political and economic influence of actors such as 
Russia, China and the United States.  
 
Indeed, the period following the official visit of the Uzbek leader to Belarus showed a decline 
in the interest of the state structures of Minsk and Tashkent in bilateral cooperation. The 
potential for interaction between countries is mentioned less and less in the media of both 
partner countries. 
 
At the same time, with the political will of the leadership of the two countries, and active 
support from society and business, noticeable progress in Belarusian-Uzbek relations can 
lead to positive economic results for both countries.  This article has shown the scope of 
bilateral relations in an increasingly multilateral space. The relations between Uzbekistan 
and Belarus show the importance of a multi vector foreign policy which does not stop with 
forming partnerships with bigger, more powerful countries, but locates interests of mutual 
benefit with smaller, similar states as well. 
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MUNIRA SHAHIDI1 – Personal contacts in Cultural 
Diplomacy of Central Asia 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The idea of Cultural Diplomacy (CD) as building capacity in terms of peace and intercultural 
communication, regardless of religion, language or place of origin, has been developed in 
Central Asia (CA) on the annals of the historical Silk Road. Although the transformation of 
the idea into a global New Silk Road project was already announced by U.S. Secretary of 
State Hilary Clinton in 2011, the initiative never got off the ground. One problem was that the 
capacity of CA for harmonization of cultures is still limited. Historically, the region was at the 
‘cross-roads’ of cultures, and now it is trying to renew its own national/regional cultural 
capacity.  
   
This paper argues that personal contacts including research integration are crucial for the 
development of CD in the region and beyond. I will start from a small historical observation 
of the modern history of CD in CA.   
 
The historical establishment of the Cultural Diplomacy concept 
            
The modern concept of CD in CA as peaceful, creative inter-activity of two or more cultures, 
has been formed in the epoch of Timurids in the 14th and 15th century and has been renewed 
twice during the 19th and 20th century. The first adaptation was  in Bukhara in the 19th 
century, where CD was applied through ‘Bedil-khoni’ or ‘Bedil-readings’, as non-official, all-
regional, multilingual public gatherings. Connected with the name of the Persian-speaking 
poet of India, Abdulkadir Bedil (1642-1720), these gatherings were a cradle for the ideas of 
the leading figures of the reformatory movement of Bukhara such as Ahmadi Danish (1827-
1897), Abdurauf Fitrat (1885-1938), and Sadriddin Ayni (1878-1954). Later, during the Soviet 
period, the Bedilian ideas of synthesizing and harmonizing diversity of religions and cultures, 
such as Islam and Hinduism, was widened to Christianity and Buddhism in their modern 
interpretations. The Badilian views were harshly suppressed by the Bolsheviks after the 
October Revolution and by the Soviets in the 1950s, but continued to develop through 
personal contacts and influenced the ‘central’ governments. In this way, it contributed to the 
creation of region-wide sustainable communities, gradually attracting academic researchers 
from neighbouring countries, such as Iran, Afghanistan, as well as academic schools of 
Eurasia, especially in Eastern Europe. This begs the question of why this ‘holistic vision’ of 
Central Asia, modernising Persian-speeking classical heritage, is still marginalized in 
contemporary academic discussions? A holistic vision of global peace (sulh-I kull in Tajik) 
can help to understand the unity of humanity in all its diversity of cultures. Although 
comparative literature/cultural studies have been evaluating what values CA has in common 
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with Asian cultures, on the one hand, and European cultures, on the other, the findings of 
collaborative research have been marginalized from the policy of international affairs 
g/locally. Still, these academic findings have impacted public consciousness through the 20th 
century, mostly via so-called ‘rhythm and melodies’, as will be shown later on in this paper. 
 
Shared values of the region, such as ‘adam va alam’ –‘human and humanity’, identified in 
their specific regional characteristics by academic research, have significantly impacted the 
process of forming and developing national theatres, dance, art, novels, new styles of songs 
and polyphonic music. This process has in turn also affected neighbouring countries, such 
as Afghanistan, Iran, India and Pakistan, through personal contacts between political, 
academic and creative people. As a matter of fact, globalization had already started in CA 
before the term turned up in academic discussions. The ideas of globalisation, formed within 
the Avicennian tradition (Ibn Sina/Avicenna) that was original and organic for the region, was 
gradually adopted by the academic community globally. These ideas are now coming back 
to the region in innovative forms. When thousands of scholars, engineers and actors of 
cultures, escaping from warring Europe and Russia, found a creative atmosphere in CA, 
especially before and during WW2, that diversity of minds and cultures awakened an interest 
in the original roots of the local/regional traditions. In the decades since independence,   
governmental and non-governmental organizations for peace and development are again 
cooperating successfully via different projects including GCRF COMPASS, which helped 
organise meetings in Tashkent.    
  
Cultural Diplomacy and academic cooperation through COMPASS 
 
The conference on regional security held in Tashkent built on discussions that took place at 
a previous conference in Dushanbe (16-17 September 2019) and can be considered as a 
renewal, rather than the construction, of the region’s tradition of collaborative research. 
Although the conference concentrated on Uzbekistan’s responsibility regarding security and 
global change, the aims and targets of both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are closely connected. 
Relevant aspects to examine further are therefore related to the role of personal contacts as 
well as international cooperation projects in the strengthening of CD. The paper will now look 
at these two aspects in more detail.   
 
The role of personal contacts in Cultural Diplomacy 
 
Personal contacts in the policy, sciences and arts were always the driving force for the peace-
building and development of the CA region, even during the hard times of the civil war in 
Tajikistan (1992-1997). However, such personal contacts are not visible in the current 
political landscape of the region. While the governments of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan aim to 
work together, they are still keeping some distance from the scholarly/academic community 
for solving common problems for the region and the global world. It would therefore be helpful 
to evaluate the experiences of the near past in overcoming personal vulnerability by building 
a mutual space with the ‘other’. By rethinking and revaluating experience of the previous 
generation, this practice can be encouraged. As an example, I want to highlight a code of 
personal contacts of four key figures of the near past. Developing a holistic vision of the 
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region, they contributed and continue to contribute significantly to the current aspiration to 
change the world order. The four figures of note are: Sharaf Rashidov (1917- 1983), 
Sadriddin Ayni (1878-1954), Emomali Rahmon and Shavkat Mirsieev. 
 
Uzbek politician and writer Sharaf Rashidov, was one of the most influential persons of the 
20th century. However, a re-evaluation of Rashidov’s behaviour in re-building trust and 
mutual respect between the people of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan after WW2, still waits in the 
wings. Most spectacular was his cracking of prejudices toward the prisoners of the Gulag, 
returning from the ‘places not so distant’. The then leader of Uzbekistan took an active part 
in re-integration of the former exiles into the social and creative life of the two neighbouring 
countries. Due to the protection and support of Sharaf Rashidov, Gani Abdullo (famous 
drama-writer in Tajikistan in the 1950s-1980s) and Rahim Khoshim (literature critic) re-
innovated their art of writers, when they were back from the Gulag. They were again active 
in the creation of the new theatre, novels and arts post-WW2. Most of them were graduates 
of the Samarkand State University. Among Rashidov’s classmates and fellow countrymen, 
involved in the process of reinvigorating regional human values, including freedom of thought 
and communication with ‘others’, were poets, composers and academics, such as Habib 
Usufi, Sultan Umarov, Turakul Zehni, Ziyodullo Shahidi, Muhammad Osimi, Akobir 
Adhamov, and Eshonkul Numanov, to name but a few. Working in the rearward of WW2 or 
coming back from the frontiers, they were developing their world vision, based on the original 
interregional ‘Bedilian readings’ and anti-fascist and anti-military movement, common for the 
second part of the last century. Sharaf Rashidov, himself a philologist, was keen on 
Abdulkadir Bedil’s philosophy as a cradle of reformatory’s idea of releasing CA from the 
isolation of the Soviet times. He supported translations from the ‘other’ literatures and 
popularised them through theatre scenes and cinema productions. Later on, comparative 
literature/arts studies of China, CA, India, Turkey and South-East Europewere formed, 
targeted towards integration into the bigger world and nourished by the basic idea of classical 
Tajik-Persian literature: ‘Art vs. Power’. Based on pre-Soviet literature and serving as a 
source of inspiration for the new ideas in literature and arts of 1950s-1980s, rethinking 
creativity became important as never before.  
 
The second key figure I would like to discuss in this paper is the Tajik intellectual Sadriddin 
Ayni. A number of masterpieces in music, initiated by Ayni’s interpretation of Bedilian poems 
and qazals-lyrical poems was developed by the first generation of modern composers of two 
neighbouring countries, among others: Mukhtar Ashrafi, Mutal Burkhanov, and Ziodullo 
Shahidi. Due to a number of symphony pieces that integrated national tunes and rhythms 
into polyphonic soundings of the modern world, they were cooperating actively to leave a 
stable intellectual national/regional property for the current and future generations. Due to 
the personal and professional collaboration of Mukhtar Ashrafi and Ziyodullo Shahidi, an 
opera of the Uzbek composer, ‘Timurmalik’ had been staged at Opera House in Tajikistan in 
Tajik in the 1960s and Ziyodullo Shahidi’s ‘Komde va Madan’ was staged at the Opera House 
of Uzbekistan, in Samarqand in Uzbek in the 1970s. Empowering those collaborations in 
innovating arts of their own time, Sharaf Rashidov encouraged Tajik Literature and Art in 
Tashkent for over several decades, as well as the construction of a museum for Sadriddin 
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Ayni in Samarqand and Bukhara. Rashidov used to say that the famous Tajik writer was a 
‘teacher of all of us’.  
 
The scholarly activity of Sadriddin Ayni in Dushanbe (then Stalinabad) as the President of 
the newly established Academy of Sciences, started by opening a Department of 
Manuscripts, initiating collaborative research on common Muslim and non-Muslim sources 
of knowledge in Asia and Europe. Ayni’s prophecy during Soviet times contributed to CA’s 
resilience against marginalization from the external world. His concept has been developed 
by Abdulgani Mirzoev and the other academic schools of CA and Eastern Europe, where 
Yan Rypka, Irji Bechka, and Yana Kubichkova eagerly met his highly critical approach to the 
colonial concept of Western orientalism.2  Sharp critics on the marginalization of the capacity 
for harmonization of cultures for peace and development, initiated by A. Mirsoev, has been 
met in the neighbouring countries of CA and beyond, including Afghanistan, Iran, India, and 
Pakistan, building the foundations for CD in nowadays, intensive world.  
 
Current international cooperation projects on regional Cultural Diplomacy 
 
Though the project of the New Silk Road was born in the present West, the initial idea for the 
project came from Tajikistan, when archeological discoveries exposed the objects and 
pictures of Hellenistic, Iranian, Indian and Chinese images intermixed. That historical 
interpenetration was demonstrated at the Kushan conference in Dushanbe in 1968.3 Greco-
Buddhist-Bactrian-Sogdian arts represented one of the most vivid findings. The pictures of 
musicians, singers and dancers, serving as a symbol of connection of terrestrial and 
heavenly starts of the human being in their interconnection, were demonstrated once again 
during the international conference on the ‘Music (opera) of the New Silk Road, dedicated to 
centenary of Ziyodullo Shahidi’ in 2016. Financed by UNESCO, the conference was able to 
bring together academics, diplomats and actors of cultures of the countries of CA, China, 
Europe, Russia and USA.  
 
At the start of the 2000s, the Z. Shahidi International Foundation initiated publication of the 
j. Fonus, as a common platform for the regional peace and development studies. Financed 
by the Swiss Cooperation Offices (SCOs) in Dushanbe, it has been targeted to be presented 
in each country of CA. These presentations, however, would not have been possible in 
Uzbekistan at the time without support of Uchkun Nazarov, a well-known writer in 
Uzbekistan, and Dilbar Rashidova, an expert in musical studies, since clerical and 
institutional cultures were still stacked in their boxes of stereotypes of the out-dated 
diplomacy.  
 
European experts from the Gothenburg and Sorbonne universities4 are also eager for 
collaborative research. Although diplomatic relations between Tajikistan and European 
                                                     
2 Yan Rypka (1964). History of Iranian Literature, Reidel Publishing. 
3 Tsentralnaya Azia v Kushanskuyu Epokhu. International Conference on History, Archeology and Culture of 
Central Asia in the Kushan Period. Dushanbe, 27 September – 6 October 1968. Published: 1974 
4 Where I was working through scholarships of the Swedish Institute (1995-1996) and the Maison des Sciences 
de L’Homme (2004-2005). 
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countries are developing through the last decades, interests for business and immediate 
economical income prevail over intercultural communication. According to Firdavs Sharipov 
from TNU, priorities of the French business in Tajikistan are hydro-energetics, the aluminium 
industry, large deposits of precious metals and stones, agriculture, restoration and 
development of tourism in the country.5 Though the special institutions, like ‘Baktrya’ are 
functioning in Tajikistan, providing cultural activities, their main aim is to promote French 
culture in Tajikistan without any efforts for intercultural, Tajik-French intercultural 
communication. The same situation more or less characterises other European institutions 
that are present in Tajikistan. A similar situation can be seen in most embassies of Tajikistan 
in the EU. Paradoxically, studies on intercultural communication between former Soviet 
countries and especially between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have almost stopped now, 
despite the huge number of sources on this issue that were published in the 1950s-1980s, 
including translations from Uzbek into Tajik and vice versa. How to restore this activity? How 
to revive Tajik-Uzbek-Azerbaijani-Belarusian-British intercultural contacts now, in a quite 
chaotic and tense world? Projects such as Erasmus+ and GCRF COMPASS are contributing 
significantly to these challenges. Young researchers are getting experience through their 
trainings in Kent, Cambridge, Minsk, Baku, Tashkent, and Bukhara. But the mutual activity 
has to be sped up. Maybe a special programme should be created by the Consortium for 
intercultural communication in the region and beyond?  
 
Conclusion 
 
The Eurasian space with all its interconnection and interpenetration of cultures is still not 
known in the university programmes g/locally. During the lectures, both at TNU and other 
universities of the world, I usually receive a number of questions. The common questions 
are: What are the priorities of Tajikistan and other countries of CA today? How are they 
responding to the changing world? What are the priorities of the young generation of 
researchers and how should universities cooperate? Though GCRF COMPASS is trying to 
answer these questions, these responses have to be heard globally.   
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JACOB L. SHAPIRO1 – Uzbekistan as a Eurasian power: 
Opportunities and challenges 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The decline of Russian power and the instability of U.S. foreign policy has combined with the 
expansion of Chinese, Indian, Turkish, and Iranian geostrategic ambitions to offer both new 
possibilities and dangerous challenges to Central Asian states. How Uzbekistan in particular 
takes advantage of and copes with these opportunities and dangers will play a major role in 
defining the future of Central Asia in the next decade. Eurasia is a fraught term, and in 
considering Uzbekistan’s role in wider Eurasia, it is necessary first to understand what is at 
stake in this term, and second to understand in what ways Uzbekistan might be able to shape 
future definitions and considerations for Eurasian countries. Uzbekistan’s role in Eurasia 
manifests in four key areas, namely: relations between Islam and state; as a model for other 
Central Asian countries; as a regional leader of Central Asia; and, as will be discussed in the 
conclusion, as a connector of wider Eurasia. How Uzbekistan emerges and what kinds of 
policies it pursues – and is successful at executing, will have a profound impact on Central 
Asia, and as a result, on all the countries with interests in and ambitions for Eurasia. 
 
Eurasia and its Discontents 
 
It is difficult to interrogate Uzbekistan’s role in wider Eurasia without first engaging with what 
the highly ambiguous term “Eurasia” actually means. In strictly geographic terms, “Eurasia” 
is a continent stretching from Lisbon to Seoul, from Helsinki to Basra. Defining Uzbekistan’s 
role in this geography is relatively simple. Uzbekistan is the linchpin of the general region 
called Central Asia, which also includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
and Afghanistan if one is being generous. Uzbekistan is one of only two doubly-land locked 
states in the entire world (the other is Lichtenstein), and yet it is also the only country in 
Central Asia which borders all of the others. Uzbekistan is a geographic paradox from this 
point of view, as it is arguably more isolated than almost any other country in the entire 
Eurasian continent – and yet it is the vital connector of an entire region within this vast 
landmass. 
 
There is very little agreement at all over what the word “Eurasia” actually means in practice. 
Saul Bernard Cohen – a famous American geographer and professor – loosely defines 
Eurasia as the states of the former Soviet Union minus the Eastern European ones, which 
he calls a “European convergence zone.”2 Abbott Gleason wrote an essay entitled “What is 
Eurasia” and in it he writes about a time he was invited to a seminar at Harvard University 
on “Eurasian Civilization” which included the combined continents of not just Asia and Europe 
                                                     
1 Perch Perspectives, LLC. Contact: jashap@gmail.com 
2 Cohen, Saul Bernard (2014). Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations. (United States: Rowman 
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– but Africa as well!3 Even at the geographic level, there are very different ideas about what 
“Eurasia” really means so much so that the term itself seems endlessly malleable. 
 
The difficulties go deeper still, however, because the disagreement is not just confined to the 
geographic sphere. It is ideological as well.4 The British geopolitical thinker Halford 
Mackinder for example talks about Euro-Asia in his most famous work, “The Geographical 
Pivot of History.”5 This however was not an objective description, but a way for Mackinder to 
justify his fear of a potential German-Russian alliance and the dangers such an alliance 
would pose to the British Empire. Mackinder invented his concept of Euro-Asia because he 
needed such a category to exist, so he could have a basis for recommending and arguing 
for British foreign policies. 
 
This is equally true for other conceptions as well. There was a faction of anti-Bolsheviks in 
Russia in the 1920s and 1930s who articulated an idea of “Eurasianism” as opposed to that 
of Communism as an alternative basis for the organization of Russia’s sovereignty after the 
fall of the Tsar.6 This “Eurasianism” was basically an argument for Russia to dominate all the 
former areas of the Russian Empire because they were Eurasian. For China, it is the absence 
of any concept of “Eurasia” in its strategic thinking that is most striking. The Qing Dynasty, 
like other incarnations of Chinese kingdoms, conceived of China as the Middle Kingdom, the 
center of the universe. There was China, and then everyone else was either a vassal or a 
barbarian.7 China has only recently started talking and thinking about Eurasia – and never 
identifies itself as Eurasian.  
 
In this sense, thinking about Uzbekistan’s role depends on whose definition of Eurasia one 
uses. China’s version of “Eurasia” is a series of countries connected by road, rail, and 5G 
networks to Beijing. China wants and needs to secure access to raw materials, like oil and 
natural gas, as well as to sell to new markets and lessen its dependency on maritime trade 
routes. Uzbekistan’s role in China’s Eurasia is as a source of gas and food, as a market to 
sell to, and as a connector to countries like Turkmenistan and Iran. Russia is worried about 
its security and its status as a great power – and so it views integrating Uzbekistan into 
institutions like the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
as a way of re-establishing Russian dominance in its former spheres of influence and 
guaranteeing its power.  
 
These of course are only two of the powers that have different definitions of Eurasia – and 
therefore different ideas about what Uzbekistan’s role in Eurasia should be. The United 
States in the past viewed Uzbekistan’s role in Eurasia quite simply: as a blocking force 
against jihadists and radical Islamists and as a logistical conduit for the U.S. war in 
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6 Schlacks, Charles and Tchantouridze, Lasha (2001). “Eurasianism: In Search of Russia’s Political Identity: A 
Review Essay.” Perspectives (no. 16): 76. 
7 Spence, Jonathan D. (1990). The Search for Modern China. (United Kingdom: Norton, 119.) 
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Afghanistan.8 As great power competition with China increases, the U.S. will change its 
viewpoint to an even simpler view: do not let Eurasia unite under the dominance or political 
control of any one power, especially China. The European Union has almost the inverse of 
the Chinese perspective: it too hopes to be the dominant political and economic force in 
Eurasia, and has pooled its sovereignty together however imperfectly in its attempt to do so. 
And this is to say nothing of Iran, Turkey, India, and others – all of which have their own 
ideas about what Eurasia is, what is strategic value is to them – and what Uzbekistan’s role 
in it should be. 
 
Uzbekistan does not have to accept these external definitions. The major difference between 
the present and the so-called “Great Game” of the 18th and 19th centuries is that the Central 
Asian states are far more organized and far more powerful relative to the Central Asian states 
of the 18th century.9 They can, to a certain extent, resist some of these external definitions 
and political goals. 
 
Uzbekistan can play an important role in wider Eurasia in helping to redefine what “Eurasia” 
means in the first place, and specifically from a Central Asian perspective. Uzbekistan, for 
understandable reasons, closed itself off from much of the world and even from its 
neighbours after independence in 1991 because it wanted to protect its newfound 
sovereignty. But Uzbekistan is the most populous state in Central Asia – almost 45 percent 
of the region’s population lives in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan is also a very young country. The 
working-age population has increased by about 3 million people in the last decade and is 
projected to increase even more in the coming years.10 And Uzbekistan, because of its 
unique geographic position, is the only country that can truly connect the Central Asian states 
and help them become more than a collection of distrustful and immature states attempting 
to catch up from the Soviet disadvantage they started with.11  
 
Uzbekistan’s Roles 
 
There are three key roles Uzbekistan can play in this regard – roles that will affect not just 
Central Asia, but the entire Eurasian landmass. The first is Uzbekistan’s approach to Islam. 
As Uzbekistanis are all too aware, the Muslim world is in a state of Civil War, a battle not 
unlike the religious wars of 17th century Europe, in which people fought and died over not 
just sectarian religious ideas but what the appropriate place should be between religion and 
state. The Muslim world is going through this battle now – and the spill over potential in 
Central Asia and Uzbekistan in particular is high because of the border with Afghanistan. 
Central Asia is the third largest source of foreign fighters in the Syrian Civil War and in the 
                                                     
8 Nichol, Jim (2013). Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests. (United States: Congressional 
Research Service, 15.) 
9 Hopkirk, Peter (1990). The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia. (United Kingdom: John Murray 
Press.) 
10 Republic of Uzbekistan 2019 Article IV Consultation (2019). (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 
55.) 
11 Hirsch, Francine (2000). "Toward an Empire of Nations: Border-Making and the Formation of Soviet National 
Identities." The Russian Review (59, no. 2): 201-26. 
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rise of the Islamic State.12 This is because Central Asian states like Uzbekistan have 
historically not been able to provide sufficient jobs, and sufficient confidence that the future 
will be better than the present, to its young people, many of whom become migrant workers, 
and embrace poisonous ideologies only after they are separated from home, tradition, and 
family. The decision to become a jihadist is seldom an ideal choice – life has to be 
disappointing in a deep and profound way for jihadism to be attractive. 
 
Uzbekistan is leading the way here in two key areas. The current government is undertaking 
very challenging and difficult economic and labour market reforms precisely because doing 
so will allow Uzbekistan to offer a more promising and inspirational future to its young people. 
The government is also combining this with support for a more moderate, uplifting, and 
inspirational vision of Islam as a religion of peace and compassion that is not in conflict with 
the secular governance of the state.13 There are few if any other countries attempting this in 
the Muslim world to the extent that Uzbekistan is, as many secular governments in the 
Muslim world are afraid of attacking or isolating those who purport to speak for “tradition.” 
Uzbekistan could emerge as a key leader of the Muslim world if its approach is successful, 
and there is historic precedence for leadership of the Muslim world to emanate from Central 
Asia.14 
 
The second is as a model for the other countries of Central Asia in general. The Central 
Asian states were designed to be part of a greater whole with Moscow at the centre. 
Everything from how the borders were drawn, to the quality of the transportation and 
manufacturing infrastructure, to where and who possesses control over natural resources, to 
the organization and power of the security forces in the role of everyday life – all of these 
were designed with the Soviet Union in mind. Each Central Asian state was a piece of a 
bigger puzzle that was designed to work together. Uzbekistan’s political and economic 
reforms can offer a blueprint and a model for other Central Asian states to follow as they 
attempt to exceed these limitations – a blueprint that has not been available because no 
state has felt secure enough to take major steps forward. 
  
The third is as a regional leader. Take the issue of water scarcity. This is an existential 
problem for Uzbekistan.15 It has also caused many problems in bilateral relations between 
Uzbekistan and neighbouring countries like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.16 In recent years 
Uzbekistan has changed its previous stance and is now attempting to resolve these problems 
diplomatically. For instance, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are attempting to solve their border 
                                                     
12 Tucker, Noah (2015). Central Asian Involvement in the Conflict in Syria and Iraq: Drivers and Responses. 
(Arlington: United States Agency for International Development, iii.)  
13 Cornell, Svante and Zenn, Jacob (2018). Religion and the Secular State in Uzbekistan. (Lithuania: Central 
Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, 22-23.) 
14 Khalid, Adeeb (2003). "A Secular Islam: Nation, State, and Religion in Uzbekistan." International Journal of 
Middle East Studies (35, no. 4): (2003): 576-577. 
15 Central Asia Energy-Water Development Program Annual Report (2016). (Washington D.C.: The World 
Bank, 2017, 19.) 
16 Russell, Martin (2018). Water in Central Asia: An Increasingly Scarce Resource. (Brussels: European 
Parliamentary Research Service, 4. 
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issues with minor land swaps and better communication.17 Meanwhile, Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan are cooperating and coordinating on border issues more than ever before in their 
histories as independent countries.18 Uzbekistan has withdrawn objections to projects like 
the Kambar Ata 1 and Roghun Dams because it knows that for Central Asia to tackle its 
water scarcity problems, the region is going to have to work together, and there needs to be 
trust and understanding of mutual benefit that can come from cooperation.19  
 
Uzbekistan has the potential to be a regional power. How a regional power treats other 
countries in the region often defines how relations will be in those countries. If a regional 
power pursues zero-sum competition with its neighbours, its neighbours will be suspicious 
and hostile. If a regional power is strong and confident enough to pursue coordination and 
cooperation – to recognize that independence and sovereignty are not mutually exclusive 
with compromise and cooperation – then even a region as violent as Europe can and has 
become peaceful and prosperous. Uzbekistan has a previously unutilized reservoir of this 
kind of “soft power” that it can exercise and which it has only just begun to realize. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Uzbekistan has a role to play as a connector of the entire Eurasian continent. Uzbekistan 
has essentially two different grand strategies it can pursue: it can close itself off from the 
world and jealously guard its independence and insularity – or it can be the connecting force 
for Eurasia.20 This latter approach requires openness and cooperation, and an understanding 
that pursuing this strategy means that Uzbekistan benefits as the Central Asian region in 
general benefits and as the Eurasian region more generally benefits. Uzbekistan can use 
this position to encourage Central Asian states to pursue regional interests rather than having 
to kowtow to external interests or be forced by outside powers to behave or act in certain 
ways. Uzbekistan can for example insist that Central Asia is neutral ground for any who want 
to do business there. The Silk Road did not have a nationality. Uzbekistan can embody this 
by encouraging partnerships with other countries who have Eurasian prosperity – for all 
Eurasian countries – in mind, rather than for the political and strategic benefit of a few. 
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HUASHENG ZHAO97 – Uzbekistan’s important role in the 
Afghan issue 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Afghan issue is entering a new phase. Although the battle is still going on and the 
military conflict is still fierce, from a macro perspective, the Afghan issue is facing a new 
situation, which is the beginning stage of political negotiations. 
 
While promoting political reconciliation in Afghanistan has been the consensus of the 
international community for years, there has never been more urgency and more action 
to get the political peace process started. 
 
New approach by the Taliban 
 
The Taliban, too, seems to have changed. While continuing to adhere to its usual 
negotiating terms, it has softened its approach by becoming more willing to engage with 
the international community, dropping its complete refusal to participate in all international 
events on the Afghanistan and beginning to appear at some international conferences. 
Representatives from the Taliban's Doha office have been to Moscow, Tashkent and 
China, and all but reach the United States. That is why there is a glimmer of hope in the 
political negotiations. 
 
It is not clear whether the Taliban's change is substantial, whether it is truly prepared to 
compromise and enter the structure of the Afghan state machinery through reconciliation, 
or whether it is simply a strategy aimed at seizing power. 
 
Position of the USA, Russia and China 
 
The United States remains the most critical external player in Afghanistan, but the United 
States intends to reduce its military presence, reduce political, financial and security 
burdens. The United States wants to negotiate a political arrangement that will allow it to 
disengage in a dignified and smooth way, in part, without major disruption in Afghanistan. 
 
The United States, Russia and China are all trying to promote political negotiations in 
Afghanistan, and each has its own platform. There have been nine rounds of negotiations 
between the US and the Taliban in Doha. Russia held two international conferences on 
Afghanistan in 2017 and 2018, and China invited the Taliban to Beijing. In this context, 
Uzbekistan seems to have an important role to play. 
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Uzbekistan’s role in conflict mediation 
 
The war in Afghanistan has been going on for more than 40 years, since the 1979 Soviet 
war in Afghanistan. It is the strong desire of the international community, especially 
countries in the region, to put an end to civil strife and embark on the path of peaceful 
development in Afghanistan. However, given the complexity of the Afghan issue and the 
difficulties in Afghanistan's reconstruction, no country can do it alone.  
 
Uzbekistan is a neighbour of Afghanistan. Although the common border between 
Uzbekistan and Afghanistan is not very long, only 144 kilometers, it exercises great impact 
on the security of Uzbekistan. 
 
Uzbekistan has been paying close attention to the Afghan issue and has the idea of 
playing a unique role in the settlement of the Afghan issue. Uzbekistan, which has a deep 
understanding of Afghanistan, has always advocated political negotiations and national 
reconciliation in Afghanistan, believing that military means cannot solve the Afghan 
problem. 
 
In the period before the outbreak of the Afghan war in 2001, Uzbekistan actively worked 
on the Afghanistan issue by relying on the "6+2" framework. The so-called "6+2" refers to 
the "group of neighbours and friends of Afghanistan", which is composed of the six 
neighbouring countries of Afghanistan, namely Pakistan, China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, Iran, plus Russia and the United States. In July 1999, the "6+2" deputy 
foreign ministers' meeting was held in Tashkent. Uzbekistan hosted the meeting. The 
highlight of the meeting was the participation of Afghanistan's warring parties, including 
the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. Another success of the "6+2" conference in 
Tashkent was the issuance of the Tashkent declaration, in which the parties affirmed the 
principle of settling the Afghan issue through peaceful negotiations.  
 
The Taliban were overthrown in 2001. In March 2002, the "6+2" convened an informal 
meeting in Kabul to reaffirm support for the Afghan peace process and for the interim 
Afghan government led by President Hamid Karzai. After that, "6+2" basically stopped its 
activities. In 2008, Uzbek President Islam Karimov proposed the resumption of "6+2" 
activities and proposed to change it to "6+3", namely by bringing NATO into the talks. 
 
Since president Mirziyoyev took office in 2016, there have been significant adjustments in 
Uzbekistan's internal and foreign affairs. Uzbekistan has a broader vision of diplomacy, 
more balanced relations with major countries, and more friendly relations with 
neighbouring countries. Its diplomatic goals are more pragmatic and its style is more 
active and flexible. At the same time, Uzbekistan is more aware of regional leadership and 
intends to play a bigger role in regional and international affairs. 
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The Tashkent Conference 
 
In September 2017, President Mirziyoyev expounded his thoughts on regional security at 
the UN general assembly. Subsequently, in November 2017, Uzbekistan hosted the 
conference "Central Asia: Common Past and Future, Cooperation for Stable Development 
and Common Prosperity" in Samarkand. At the meeting, President Mirziyoyev put forward 
a comprehensive programme for maintaining peace and stability in central Asia and 
Afghanistan. In January 2018, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan organized a press conference 
for the Tashkent conference at the United Nations. Uzbekistan organized the "5+1" foreign 
ministers' meeting between Central Asian countries and Afghanistan. The culmination of 
Uzbekistan’s serial efforts was the international conference on the Afghan peace process, 
security cooperation and regional coordination, which was held in Tashkent in March 
2018. 
 
Uzbekistan is not using the Tashkent conference as a one-time event, but as a means to 
build an internationally recognised mechanism that will organise more bilateral and 
multilateral activities within its framework to have an impact on Afghanistan. Uzbekistan 
believes that although there are many international mechanisms on the Afghan issue, the 
international community needs a unified programme, a unified understanding, a common 
mechanism and a common roadmap. 
 
The Tashkent conference was a great success, as can be seen from the number of 
participants. The number of participating countries was not only large, but also very 
representative. It covered all the countries concerned, including all the big countries, all 
the Central Asian countries, the major countries of the European Union, the major 
countries of West Asia and South Asia, and the major Arab countries. 
 
The Tashkent conference issued the Tashkent declaration, which elaborated on the basic 
principles and positions for the settlement of the Afghan question. The core of the 
declaration is to promote direct negotiations between the Afghan government and the 
Taliban without preconditions. Uzbekistan has spoken highly of the declaration, calling it 
a "road map" for resolving the Afghan issue. 
 
Conclusion 
 
To summarise, Uzbekistan has a very important role to play in the common efforts of the 
international society to promote political reconciliation of Afghanistan. It will not replace 
the roles and functions of other countries, such as the US, China, Russia, and Pakistan, 
however, its role will be unique and irreplaceable. 
 
At the same time, it should not be neglected that Uzbekistan could make significant 
contributions in the field of Afghanistan’s reconstruction, in connecting Afghanistan into 
regional transportation networks, and in integrating Afghanistan into regional economic 
cooperation. 
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Historically, Uzbekistan has not pursued geopolitical interests and does not join 
geopolitical games of great powers in Afghanistan, which makes all the major countries 
willing to support it. Russia and the United States are great powers that cooperate on 
Afghanistan, but at the same time engage in infighting and mutual restraint, which limits 
their respective capabilities. The international conference on Afghanistan in Moscow 
made that clear.  
Although Uzbekistan does not have the status of a world power, Tashkent showed that 
Uzbekistan has unique advantages in solving the Afghanistan issue. Uzbekistan believes 
that it can play an important role in the peace process in Afghanistan, because Uzbekistan 
and Afghanistan have a common history and culture, and millions of Afghan Uzbeks live 
in Afghanistan.  
 
Furthermore, it has had relations with the Taliban since the beginning of the Afghan civil 
war. Uzbekistan has long advocated reconciliation between Afghan factions and political 
tolerance for the Taliban, which makes it easy to deal with the Taliban. Although the 
Taliban did not attend the international conference on Afghanistan in Tashkent, a 
delegation from the Taliban Doha representative office visited Uzbekistan in August 2018. 
According to sources, the foreign minister of Uzbekistan and the special representative 
for Afghanistan held talks with the Taliban delegation.  
 
Uzbekistan is an Islamic country. It has easy communication with Iran, Turkey and 
countries in the Middle East, and it is easier to get their understanding and support. 
Uzbekistan also seems to gain recognition and support of the Central Asian countries 
through the "5+1" mechanism. 
 
Uzbekistan furthermore is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The SCO 
member states and observer states include five of the six neighbouring countries of 
Afghanistan, as well as some other neighbouring countries with important influence on 
Afghanistan, such as Russia, Kazakhstan and India. Afghanistan is also an observer state 
of the Shanghai cooperation organization. SCO support is of great significance to 
Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan additionally maintains good relations with the European Union. 
The EU also discussed its security policy at the Tashkent conference. Moreover, 
Uzbekistan has always wisely placed its activities under the guidance of the United 
Nations, which makes it more internationally recognised. 
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